Syracuse University

SURFACE
College of Law - Faculty Scholarship

College of Law

Summer 7-26-2012

Thinking Like Non-Lawyers: Why Empathy is a Core Lawyering
Skill and Why Legal Education Should Change to Reflect its
Importance
Ian Gallacher
Syracuse University College of Law, igallach@law.syr.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/lawpub
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gallacher, Ian, "Thinking Like Non-Lawyers: Why Empathy is a Core Lawyering Skill and Why Legal
Education Should Change to Reflect its Importance" (2012). College of Law - Faculty Scholarship. 6.
https://surface.syr.edu/lawpub/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at SURFACE. It has been accepted for
inclusion in College of Law - Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information,
please contact surface@syr.edu.

THINKING LIKE NON-LAWYERS: WHY EMPATHY IS A
CORE LAWYERING SKILL AND WHY LEGAL EDUCATION
SHOULD CHANGE TO REFLECT ITS IMPORTANCE
Ian Gallacher*
We are all familiar with the famous dictum that law school should train its students
to “think like lawyers.”1 In fact, we are likely so familiar with the words, and the
concept behind them, that we rarely stop to consider the fact that a substantial
amount of lawyer communication occurs with non-lawyers; people who have not
received the same systematic training as lawyers and who, according to the implicit
message of the dictum, think very differently from the lawyers who are trying to
communicate with them. And because all lawyers have participated in
fundamentally the same educational process, and have been trained to emphasize
the importance of logic at the expense of all other responses to facts and law, we
likely have given little thought to the important role empathy plays in real-life
lawyering.
This article seeks to explore the nature of empathy in lawyer-to-non-lawyer
communication and to describe why empathy – just as much as knowledge of
applicable laws and rules and an ability to synthesize and distinguish precedent – is
a core lawyering skill. It also discusses how current legal education practices are
designed systematically to eliminate empathy from law students and why this is a
mistake that can affect a lawyer’s ability to communicate with juries, clients, and
the other non-lawyers with whom a lawyer comes into contact, And it will conclude
that law schools should make core changes in the way they teach their students and
that attention to empathy as a critical lawyering skill should begin before law
school begins, should continue throughout all three years of formal legal education,
and should continue after law students graduate from law school.

Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. An early version of portions
of this article was presented at “Once Upon A Legal Time,” the second biennial international applied
legal storytelling conference at the Lewis and Clark Law School, Portland, Oregon. Thanks to Dean
Hannah Arterian for her support, both personal and professional, in making this article possible, to
Dean Philip McConnaughay, the faculty, and staff at the Lewis Katz building of Penn State’s
Dickinson School of Law for giving an itinerant faculty member a home during the summer of 2009,
and to Professor Penny Pether, who planted the seed of this article many years ago. Thanks also to
the indefatigable Katharine Laubach who handled all my research requests with grace and skill, to
Bailey McKinstry for her company during the writing process, and to Charles Goodell, who taught
me many years ago about the importance of empathy for trial lawyers and the power of “standing
tall.” This is for Jean McKinstry, a person whose life embodied empathy, and, as always, for her
daughter Julie.
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The problem is not one of the legal writing curriculum’s making, although legal
writing, which focuses on training law students to communicate with other lawyers,
and which stresses a “lawyer-like” approach to analysis, tends to affirm rather than
contradict the lessons students learn in their doctrinal classes. But while legal
writing training might not have caused legal education to seek the elimination of
empathy from its students, it holds the key to restoring empathy to its appropriate
role as a crucial skill for all lawyers. Writing is an empathetic act, and the goal of
persuasive writers is to place themselves in their audience’s minds in order to
understand how best to influence them while they make their decisions. The
lessons legal writing faculty teach about writing and reading could easily be
adapted so that empathy could take its place besides the more traditional law school
emphasis on logical analysis and could be emphasized before and after students
come to law school, as well as during their time as law students..
The notion that empathy is so important to lawyers that it warrants a rethinking of
the law school curriculum is doubtless controversial to some. Indeed, it is easy
these days to walk into the legal empathy minefield but less easy to emerge
unscathed.2 And as some have noted, “empathy” is not a word that carries much
2
I am not alone in discussing this controversial issue. A brief and incomplete summary of
recent scholarly work on empathy in the law shows that it has been a popular subject for study:
Kristin B. Gerdy, Clients, Empathy, and Compassion: Introducing First-Year Students to the
“Heart” of Lawyering, 87 Neb. L. Rev. 1 (2008); William D. Casebeer, Identity, Culture and Stories:
Empathy and the War on Terrorism, 9 Minn. L. L. Sci. & Tech. 653 (2008); Claire A. Hill,
Introduction to the Symposium: Self and Other: Cognitive Perspectives on Trust, Empathy and the
Self, 9 Minn. J. L Sci. & Tech. 637 (2008); Richard Warner, Empathy and Compassion, 9 Minn. J.
L Sci. & Tech. 813 (2008); Jim Golden, H. Abigail Moy, & Adam Lyons, The Negotiation Counsel
Model: An Empathetic Model for Settling Catastrophic Personal Injury Cases, 13 Harv. Negot. L.
Rev. 21 (2008); Marc D. Falkoff, Conspiracy to Commit Poetry: Empathetic Lawyering at
Guantanamo Bay, 6 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 3 (2007); Sharisse O’Carroll, Empathy, Courage and
Diligence: Three Things I Wish I’d Learned in my Law School Ethics Course, 17 Prof. Lawyer 24
(No. 1 2006); Amnon Reichman, Law, Literature, and Empathy: Between Withholding and
Reserving Judgment, 56 J. Legal Educ. 296 (2006); Jody Lynee Madeira, Recognizing Odysseus’
Scar: Reconceptualizing Pain and its Empathic Role in Civil Adjudication, 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 41
(2006); Jody Lynee Madeira, Regarding Pained Sympathy and Sympathy Pains: Reason, Morality,
and Empathy in the Civil Adjudication of Pain, 58 S. C. L. Rev. 415 (2006); Craig Haney,
Condemning The Other in Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Racism, Structural Mitigation, and
the Empathic Divide, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 1557 (2004); Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not
Enough Heat: The Short Life And Fractured Ego of the Empathic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 1203 (2004); Susan Nauss Exon, The Best Interest of the Child: Going Beyond
Legalize to Empathize with a Client’s Leap of Faith, 24 J. Juv. L. 1 (2003-04); Laurel E. Fletcher &
Harvey M. Weinstein, When Students Lose Perspective: Clinical Supervision and the Management of
Empathy, 9 Clinical L. Rev. 135 (2002-03); V. Pualani Enos & Lois H. Kanter, Who’s Listening?
Introducing Students to Client-Centered, Client-Empowering, and Multidisciplinary Problem-Solving
in a Clinical Setting, 9 Clinical L. Rev. 83 (2002-03); Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and
Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and Unworthy Victims, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 343 (2002-03); Rachel
D. Godsil, Expressivism, Empathy And Equality, 36 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 247 (2002-03); Michael
J. Zimmer, Systemic Empathy, 34 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.575 (2002-03); Jeanne L. Schroeder,
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authority.3 Lynne Henderson has observed that “[e]mpathy has become a favorite
word in critical and feminist scholarship. Unfortunately, it is never defined or
described – it is seemingly tossed in as a ‘nice’ word in opposition to something bad
or undesirable. . . .”4 More recently, the word has become a political plaything, with
President Obama declaring, in his search to replace Justice Souter on the Supreme
Court bench, that empathy is “an essential ingredient for arriving at just decisions
and outcomes”5 and Senator Jeff Sessions replying that he was “troubled” by
President Obama’s use of the “empathy standard” when selecting federal judges:6
[T]his view – that a judge should use his or her personal feelings about
a particular group or issues to decide a case -- . . . stands in stark
contrast to the impartiality that we expect in the American courtroom.
If a judge is allowed to let his or her feelings for one party in the case
sway his decision, hasn’t that judge then demonstrated a bias against
the other party? And, if a judge is allowed to inject his personal views
into the interpretation of the law, does he not then have a license to
rewrite the laws to fit his own preferences?
I fear that this ‘empathy standard’ is another step down the path to a
cynical, relativistic, results-oriented world:
•
•
•

Where words and laws have no fixed meaning;
Where unelected judges set policy;
And where Constitutional limits on government power are ignored
when they are inconvenient to the powerful.

Economic Rationality, Empathy, and Corporate Responsibility, 70 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 875 (2002);
Joshua D. Rosenberg, Teaching Empathy in Law School, 36 U. S. F. L. Rev. 621 (2001-02); Justin
D’Arms, Empathy and Evaluative Enquiry, 74 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 1467 (1998-2000); Lynda OlsenFulero & Solomon M. Fulero, An Empathy-Complexity Theory of Rape Juror Story Making, 3
Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 402 (1997); Sheldon Nahmod, The Restructuring of Narrative and Empathy
in Section 1983 Cases, 72 Chi-Kent L. Rev.819 (1996-97); Teresa Bruce, The Empathy Principle, 6
Law & Sexuality 109 (1996); Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman,
1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 769 (1994); Stephen Ellman, Empathy and Approval, 43 Hastings L. J. 991
(1991-92); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old
Wounds, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099 (1988-89); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy 85 Mich. L.
Rev. 1574 (1986-87).
3
Massaro, supra n. 2, at 2106.
4
Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1578 (1986-87).
5
Peter Slevin, Obama Makes Empathy a Requirement for Court, Washington Post (May 19,
2009), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/05/12/AR2009051203515.html.
6
Senator Jefferson Sessions, Weekly Republican Address (June 6, 2009), available at
http://www.gop.com/News/NewsRead.aspx?Guid=ebbe52d7-8d7b-4f2c-9c87-924b2e06e806.
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This standard is deeply troubling because it is contradictory to our
country’s long heritage of a faithful and impartial adherence to the
rule of law.7
In light of this controversy, my description of “empathy” as a core lawyering skill
might surprise some. But once the baggage commonly freighted with the word is
unpacked, its relevance to lawyers can readily be appreciated. In the context of this
article, I use the word in its simple, dictionary, meaning -- “[t]he power of projecting
one’s personality into (and so fully comprehending) the object of contemplation.”8
Indeed, as Martha Nussbaum observes, empathy is neither a good nor a bad thing.
Empathy by itself . . . is ethically neutral. A good sadist or torturer
has to be highly empathetic to understand what would cause his or her
victim maximal pain. Nor, I believe, is empathy always necessary for
compassion: we can have compassion for the sufferings of non-human
animals without being able to put ourselves inside their minds.9
And viewed in the context of this narrow interpretation, empathy can be seen to be
of extraordinary value to lawyers. A lawyer who can project him or herself into the
thoughts of another and understand how that person – juror, witness, judge, or
other lawyer, for example – is thinking, has the ability to calibrate language,
posture, and gesture in a manner calculated to persuade the subject to believe
whatever argument the lawyer is making. Conversely, a lawyer who fails to make
this empathetic connection with others will find it much more difficult – perhaps
even impossible – to communicate effectively and persuasively, especially with nonlawyers.
Before we consider how lawyers might become more empathetically attuned, we
must first step back and consider why and how the legal education process causes
lawyers, especially younger lawyers, to overemphasize a more logical approach at
the expense of empathy. That discussion forms part one of this article.10 Part two
will discuss the commonplace notion of a lawyer’s case theory as narrative, but will
Id. Senator Sessions was, of course, reprising the familiar trope that judges should respond
logically, and only logically, to the facts of cases brought before them. This is an extension of the
idea that lawyers should ‘think like lawyers’ at all times.
8
Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989), available at http://dictionary.oed.com. Apparently,
the word came into the language in the early twentieth century through the aesthetic literature as a
translation of the German “Einfühlung. Id. It is worth noting, in passing, that there is no entry for
“empathy” in Black’s Law Dictionary. If any special meaning is asserted on the word’s behalf, then,
it appears that such meaning has not become universally accepted as a legal term by the legal
community.
9
Martha Nussbaum, Reply to Amnon Reichman, 56 J. Legal Educ. 320, 325 (2006).
10
Footnotes 16-53, infra, and accompanying text.
7
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also explore the communicative nature of the multiple narratives that interact
during trial and the intertextual,11 or internarrative relationship between them.12
The idea of dueling internarrative relationships sets up the question of what
happens when a lawyer’s narrative theory conflicts with the jury’s collective
narrative expectations because of the lawyer’s empathetic failure to understand
those expectations, and, by contrast, what can happen when a lawyer is
empathetically well-attuned to both the witness and the jury’s reception of the
witness’ testimony. That discussion forms part three of this article, which examines
in detail three cases that stand as proxies for familiar lawyering tropes: the
unsuccessful prosecution theory in the O. J. Simpson case, which represents a
failure to appreciate the jury’s cultural perspective on the facts of the case; a case
from the Vioxx litigation that displays the sometimes unsuccessful corporate
defense approach that relies heavily on scientific data and objective fact; and the
Triangle Shirtwaist case which presents a successful example of tactical empathy,
showing how effective a skillful lawyer who listens to what a witness actually says,
and who understands how to communicate with juries, can be. The article will seek
to explain the potential impact on juries of these various approaches.13
Finally, part four will look suggest ways in which lawyer training, including pre and
post-law school training as well as the education that happens during the three
years of formal legal training, might change to make junior lawyers more effective
communicators.14 Especially at a time when American college students are
measurably, and dramatically, less empathetic than they used to be,15 law schools
do law students, lawyers, and society, a disservice by systematically eliminating the
empathetic response of law students and that they should reverse course and start
emphasizing the value of empathy together with the more traditional, logic-based,
approach to legal analysis.
This article will conclude that legal education should train law students to react
both logically and empathetically to factual situations, and that this training –
which could begin even before students come to law school – should continue all the
way through law school and even after students have graduated.

“Intertextuality” is a term given to the phenomenon whereby one text operates on another to
create new meanings. “Intertextuality is the current and comprehensive literary term for the concept
that each text exists in relation to others and is framed by other texts in many ways.” Jeffrey
Fischer, Killing at Close Range: A Study in Intertextuality 95 The English Journal 27, 28 (2006).
12
Footnotes 54-70, infra, and accompanying text.
13
Footnotes 75-166, infra, and accompanying text.
14
Footnotes 167-178, infra, and accompanying text.
15
Footnotes 201-02, infra, and accompanying text.
11
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A.

Thinking And Communicating Like A Lawyer

The origins of the American law school curriculum in the work of Christopher
Columbus Langdell, dean of Harvard law school during the formative years of legal
education in this country, are well known.16 The process by which law was taught
under Langdell, and by which it is mostly taught today as well, relies on the
analysis of judicial opinions “in a scientific spirit as specimens from which general
principles and doctrines could be abstracted. Once formulated, these doctrines
would be used to classify the fast-expanding mass of American legal decisions,
forming the body of law into fields such as contract law, tort law, and criminal
law.”17 Law school’s “signature”18 pedagogical approach – the so-called “Socratic”19
method,20 used especially in the first year of legal education, is intended to help
students develop a different set of analytical skills from those they have previously
employed.
Karl Llewellyn observed that “[the first year of law school] aims, in the old phrase,
to get you ‘thinking like a lawyer,’”21 and few would disagree that this is what law
schools attempt to do.22 The question implicit in this notion, though, is how should
lawyers, or at least law students, think? Llewellyn was in no doubt that lawyers
should be trained as cool, unemotional, thinkers and that is was the job of law
school to impose this analytical style onto law students who might initially be
uncomfortable with it: “The hardest job of the first year is to lop off your common
sense, to knock your ethics into temporary anesthesia. Your view of social policy,

For a discussion of Langdell’s importance in the development of the law school curriculum,
see, Catherine Pierce Wells, Langdell and the Invention of Legal Doctrine, 58 BUFF. L.REV. 551
(2010).
17
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF
LAW (the “Carnegie Report”), 5-6 (2007).
18
Id. at 24.
19
I say “so-called” because, as Martha Nussbaum notes, the process is not, in fact, very
Socratic. “Emphasis is placed on the ability to give quick answers, and to admit to being puzzled – a
key Socratic virtue – will not get the student very far. Silence and introspective searching, often the
hallmarks of good Socratic inquiry, are not much in evidence in the law school classroom. The
classroom culture usually values assertiveness, quickness, and confidence – qualities we associate
more with Socrates’s interlocutors, such as Euthyphro and Critias, rather than with Socrates
himself. In examinations, it is often more of the same: the ability cleverly to amass and organize a
lot of material in a short time is the road to success, rather than the patient searching characteristic
of Socratic inquiry.” Martha C. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity in Legal Education, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 265, 272-73 (2003).
20
Carnegie Report, supra n. 17, at 3.
21
Supra, n. 1.
22
The phrase is difficult to separate from its most famous reading, that by John Houseman in
his role as Professor Kingsfield. The Paper Chase; Pilot (CBS television broadcast September 7, 1978).

16
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your sense of justice – to knock these out of you along with woozy thinking, along
with ideas all fuzzed along their edges.”23
As things were in Llewellyn’s time, so they are today. The authors of the recent
Carnegie Report on legal education noted that
a concentrated focus on the details of particular cases, disconnected
from consideration of the larger purposes of the law, begins very early
in law school. In their all-consuming first year, students are told
repeatedly to focus on the procedural and formal aspects of legal
reasoning, its ‘hard’ edge, with the ‘soft’ sides of the law, especially
moral concerns or compassion for clients and concerns for substantive
justice, either tacitly or explicitly pushed to the sidelines.24
The Carnegie Report’s authors continued that “[t]his focus is justified on
pedagogical grounds, with an implied assumption that law school can flip off the of
ethical and human concern, teach legal analysis, and later, when students have
mastered the central intellectual skill of thinking like a lawyer, flip the switch back
on.”25
In fact, data suggest that the majority of those drawn to the law are likely to be
comfortable with this approach. In a 1997 article, Susan Daicoff summarized the
research on incoming law students and concluded that they
appear to have various distinguishing characteristics as children and
college students. They are highly focused on academics, have greater
needs for dominance, leadership, and attention, and prefer initiating
activity. . . . They may have experienced a greater emphasis on
scholastic achievement, reading, self-discipline, and the channeling of
impulses into expression in their families. . . . Their fathers were

Llewellyn, supra n. 1, at 116. Llewellyn goes on to note that the process is not without its
dangers, since the “legal machine” created out of the incoming law student “is not even a good
lawyer. It lacks insight and judgment.” Id. Nonetheless, Llewellyn concludes, it is vital for the
nascent lawyer to experience this dehumanization first, trusting that at some undefined point in
their post-law school experience, “the sapiens we shall then duly endeavor to develop will, we hope,
regain the homo.” Id. at 101. This disclaimer sounds a somewhat discordant note, since if lawyers
must add humanity back into their personalities at some point after the first year of law school, the
“lawyers” first year students are being trained to think like, in fact, do not think that way.
24
Carnegie Report, supra n. 17, at 141.
25
Id.

23
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likely dominant and strong. . . . They may have had good social skills,
but a low interest in emotion or others’ feelings.26
Significantly, a study conducted in the 1990s concluded that most law students can
be classified as “thinkers” than as “feelers.”27 Summarizing the study’s results,
Daicoff noted that:
Those who prefer to make decisions on the basis of Thinking prefer to
come to closure in a logical, orderly manner. They can readily discern
inaccuracies and are often critical. They can easily hurt others feelings
without knowing it. They are excellent problem solvers. They review
the cause and effect of potential actions before deciding. Thinkers are
often accused of being cold and somewhat calculating because their
decisions do not reflect their own personal values. They focus on
discovering truth, and they seek justice.
Those who prefer to make decisions on the basis of Feeling apply their
own personal values to make choices. They seek harmony and,
therefore, are sensitive to the effect of their decisions on others. They
need, and are adept at giving, praise. They are interested in the
person behind the idea or the job. They seek to do what is right for
themselves and other people and are interested in mercy.28
The Bell and Richard study showed that “76.5% of lawyers sampled preferred
“Thinking” over “Feeling”, while only 47.5% of the population preferred the same.29
And a 1967 study found that the personality type most prevalent in law school is
“dependable and practical with a realistic respect for facts, who absorbs and
remembers great numbers of facts and is able to cite cases to support his
evaluations and who emphasizes analysis, logic and decisiveness.”30 Students with
these characteristics dropped out of law school 6.7% of the time, whereas students
Susan Daicoff, Lawyer Know Thyself: A Review Of Empirical Research On Attorney
Attributes Bearing On Professionalism, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 1337, 1349-50 (1996-97)(citations
omitted).
27
The “thinking/feeling” dichotomy is one of the four continua evaluated by the Myers-Briggs
Type indicator. Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Be Thyself: An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship
Between the Ethic of Care, The Feeling Decisionmaking Preference, And Lawyer Wellbeing, 16 Va. J.
Soc. Pol’y & L. 87, 112 (2008). The “[t]hinking/[f]eeling decision-making preference refers not so
much to emotions or to what one ultimately decides to do, in a dilemmas, as it does to the
justifications, bases, or reasons one articulates for one’s decisions.” Id. at 113.
28
Daicoff, supra n. 26, at 1366, quoting Susan J. Bell and Lawrence R. Richard, Anatomy of a
Lawyer: Personality and Long-Term Career Satisfaction, in FULL DISCLOSURE: DO YOU REALLY
WANT TO BE A LAWYER?, 149, 152 (Susan J. Bell ed., 2d ed. 1992).
29
Daicoff, supra n. 26, at 1365, citing Bell & Richard, supra n. 29, at 229-30.
30
Daicoff, supra n. 26, at 1367, citing Paul Van R. Miller, Personality Differences and Student
Survival in Law School, 19 J. Legal Educ. 460, 466 (1967).
26
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who were “concerned chiefly with people, who value[] harmonious human contacts,
[are] friendly, tactful, sympathetic, and loyal, who [are] warmed by approval and
bothered by indifference and who tend[] to idealize what [they] admire[],” dropped
out of law school at the higher rate of 28.1%.31
In a study that appears to support these conclusions, Norman Solkoff showed that
“the lowest-ranked law students tended to obtain higher humanitarian scores,”32 a
result that, as Daicoff noted, was “consistent with later studies’ findings’ that
individuals who are more people-oriented . . . are more likely to either drop out of
law school . . . or be dissatisfied as attorneys.”33 Although these studies were
conducted some time ago, their results were replicated in 1994, “suggesting that
this preference has remained relatively consistent over time and independent of
gender influence.”34
Many law students, then, come to law school with a predisposition in favor of the
prevalent pedagogical style to be found there. For those who do not, the empathetic
response is systematically trained out of them in a first-year curriculum in which
most, if not all, their doctrinal classes share the common attribute of changing the
way they think, from intelligent laypeople to “lawyers.” And while the process of
teaching students to “think like lawyers” defines law school, it is not without its
costs. The disambiguation of life used by legal educators to compel students to
‘think like lawyers’ desaturates the landscape presented by the cases the students
study. Perhaps this brings some of the scene’s elements into sharper focus, but the
process renders the entire picture monochromatic, flat, and sterile.
In considering the law school approach, the Carnegie Report observes that
such a critical transition point in professional development needs to be
approached with great care. It is not surprising that students can be
quite confused when the professor turns [the ethical] switch off. Many
in our focus groups expressed this sort of confusion about what they
feared were the implications of this dispassionate perspective for the

Id. Thomas Mauet offers a pithy summary of the behavioral science research in this area,
noting that “’[t]hey,’ the jurors, do not think and decide like ‘us,’ the lawyers.” THOMAS A, MAUET,
TRIAL TECHNIQUES, 13 (8th ed. 2010).
32
Daicoff, Lawyer Know Thyself, supra n. 26, at 1364, citing Norman Solkoff, The Use of
Personality and Attitude Tests in Predicting the Academic Success of Medical and Law Students, 43
J. Med. Educ. 1250, 1252 (1968).
33
Daicoff, supra n. 26, at 1364-65, citing Miller, supra n. 31, at 460-67.
34
Daicoff, supra n. 26, at 1365-66, citing Lawrence R. Richard, Psychological Type and Job
Satisfaction Among Practicing Lawyers in the United States at 229-30 (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation on file with Temple University).
31
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nature of their role as lawyers, diminishing their hopes that they
might serve substantive goods in their careers.35
Others have speculated that this approach to legal education, combined with the
stresses of studying and practicing the law, is harmful to law students.36 While the
evidence is strongly supportive of this conclusion, however, my concerns with the
legal education process here are more limited and more obvious: to the extent we
succeed in making our students only think as lawyers, we make it difficult, if not
impossible, for them to think like non-lawyers. And that, in turn, makes it more
difficult for them to communicate with non-lawyers, as they must do much of the
time.
A recent study of the power of story in legal writing lends support to the notion that
new lawyers are strongly influenced by logic, and less so by pathos, or emotional
reasoning.37 In the study, Professor Kenneth Chestek drafted a series of briefs
around a hypothetical case.38 Two of these briefs were “information-based
narratives”39 or based on logical reasoning and two were “story briefs”40 or based on
emotional reasoning. Chestek then submitted the briefs to appellate judges, law
clerks, appellate court staff attorneys, appellate lawyers, and law professors and
asked them to rate the briefs for their ability to persuade.41
Once the results were tabulated, the story, or emotional reasoning, briefs were
considered to be more persuasive.42 Significantly though, for our purposes at any
rate, Chestek found that “participants with less job experience (especially including
law clerks) tended to rate the logos brief more highly than more experiences
participants did.”43 One of the explanations for this result, Chestek believed, might
be that “law schools tend to teach that ‘thinking like a lawyer’ means breaking a
fact pattern44 into small, abstract pieces, applying logical rules to those fragments,
Carnegie Report, supra n. 17, at 141.
See, e.g., Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional Denial about the Dark Side of Law School, and
Fresh Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence, 52 J. Legal Educ. 112, 117
(2002)(“Thinking ‘like a lawyer’ is fundamentally negative; it is critical, pessimistic, and
depersonalizing. It is a damaging paradigm in law schools because it is usually conveyed, and
understood, as a new and superior way of thinking, rather than an important but limited legal tool.”)
37
Kenneth D. Chestek, Judging by the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power of Story 7
J ALWD 1 (2010). Another way of putting this, although in less strictly rhetorical terms, would be to
say that these lawyers are less empathetic than more experienced lawyers and judges.
38
Id., at 8.
39
Id., at 10.
40
Id.
41
Id., at 8.
42
Id., at 29.
43
Id.
44
Chestek does not note this in his article, but lawyers are likely the only group who use the
term “fact pattern” to describe what almost anyone else would consider simply as “facts.” The phrase

35
36
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and then reasoning your way to a conclusion through syllogisms, analogies, or other
logical processes.”45
Chestek’s survey suggests that law schools do their job well, and that they produce
graduates who are persuaded by writing that emphasizes logic over emotion.46 This
should come as no surprise, since they are the product of a training scheme
designed to convince them that lawyers think differently from non-lawyers:
“[T]here are idiosyncratic aspects to legal logic not necessarily found in other
disciplines. Unlike reflective reasoning in everyday life, the statement of belief in
our major proposition in law must come from some authority. We cannot start with
a proposition simply because we have always believed it.”47 The legal writing
programs in law schools, for the most part, reinforce this message by training first
year law students how best to communicate with other lawyers, using the
structures and symbols familiar to generations of lawyers trained in fundamentally
the same way.
Lawyers have, to be sure, changed the way they write in recent years. The days of
dense, opaque language as a desirable medium of legal communication appear to be
over and clear, plain English is now generally preferred.48 And there is increased

is strongly evocative of the first year of law school, and the addition of the word “pattern” suggests a
distancing effect, as if we are no longer looking at facts that happened to real people or entities, but
rather are looking clinically at connected packets of information. In fact, Chestek’s use of this
phrase acts as a perfect rhetorical model of the process he describes.
45
Id. The other reason Chestek proposes for this result lies in the nature of a law clerk’s job
as, in essence, a judge’s lawyer. “Law clerks may tend to view their job as helping their judge find
the relevant rules of law; thus briefs that focus more on the law (rather than the story) are more
useful for that purpose.” Id., at 30. While this is a plausible explanation, it undercuts, to an extent,
the instructions Chestek gave to the survey participants, which asked them to rate the briefs they
read for persuasiveness (id., at 18) rather than utility.
46
Id., at 31 (“All of this suggests that lawyers who have most recently graduated from law
school are likely to be persuaded by logical argumentation, since they think that’s what ‘thinking
like a lawyer’ means.”) The overall results of the study also suggest that lawyers, in time, become
increasingly less persuaded by logic and are more persuaded by emotional reasoning. Id. (“[the
study’s results suggested that] the more job experience one has, the less likely one was to find the
logos brief more persuasive”). Perhaps, then, Chestek’s survey is empirical support for Llewellyn’s
hope that the law-school created sapiens gradually regains its amputated homo. See, n. 23.
47
RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING, 36 (3d. ed.
1997). While this is the message legal education sends to its students, it is unclear whether the
message is correct or not. “Legal writing teachers ‘fervently believe that learning legal reading and
writing involved the acquisition of unique cognitive processes and skills,’ but they ‘cannot point to
formal empirical evidence verifying the uniqueness.’” Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to
Legal Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. Legal Educ. 155,
166 (1999), quoting, James F. Stratman, The Emergence of Legal Composition as a Field of Inquiry:
Evaluating the Prospects, 60 Rev. Educ. Res. 153, 210 (1990).
48
See, e.g.., BRYAN A. GARNER, LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH (2001); RICHARD C. WYDICK,
PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS (5th ed. 2005). There are still some critics of the plain English
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sensitivity to the language lawyers use when writing documents that will be read by
the general public.49 Moreover, there is an increased interest in the power of
narrative, and especially to the role of rhetoric50 and storytelling51 in legal
communication.
Nonetheless, the emphasis in legal education, at least in the most formative first
year, is on training law students to communicate with other lawyers, either in
writing52 or in the formal and stylized language of oral argument before a judge or
group of judges.53 And this can prove to be a problem when the logical, “thinking”
lawyers that law school has selected and constructed come into contact with
members of the general public, who might not reach their decisions in the same way
as those with legal training.
B.

Dueling Narratives and Close Encounters
With Narratives of the Third Kind

The conflict between lawyers trained to think in only one way about a problem and
the general public, which can be more willing to entertain other ways of viewing a
set of facts, is most dramatically presented by trials.54 In these contemporary

movement in the law. See, e.g., David Crump, Against Plain English: The Case for a Functional
Approach to Legal Document Preparation, 33 Rutgers L.J. 713 (2002).
49
See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK: HOW TO CREATE CLEAR
SEC DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS (1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/handbook.pdf.
50
Two examples of the increasing interest in rhetoric and the law are Volume three of the
Journal of the Association of Legal Writing Directors, dedicated to “rhetoric and argumentation,” and
Mercer University School of Law’s Law and Rhetoric Workshop, held in January, 2009, as an adjunct
to that year’s American Association of Law Schools Conference in San Diego.
51
The Chestek survey was discussed at the second storytelling conference as was an early
version of this article. A third storytelling conference will be held in 2011 in Denver. The first
swelling of interest in legal storytelling appears to have occurred in the late 1980s. See, e.g., Kim
Lane Scheppele, Forward: Telling Stories, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2073 (1989)(foreword to legal
storytelling symposium issue of the Michigan Law Review, asking “Why is there such a rush to
storytelling? Why has narrative become such an important and recurring theme in legal scholarship
these days?”)(citations omitted).
52
See, e.g., RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING: STRUCTURE,
STRATEGY, AND STYLE, 48 (6th. ed. 2009)( (observing that the “typical” reader of a law student’s
future work will be a “judge or [attorney] supervisor.”
53
See, e.g., id., at 415-36. Later in law school, students usually have the option of taking trial
advocacy classes that help to prepare them to present evidence at trial. Although I have no
empirical evidence to support this, experience suggests that these classes – although dealing
somewhat with how to communicate directly to a jury of non-lawyers – are more concerned with the
formalities of conducting direct and cross-examinations and of the mechanics of introducing evidence
and preventing evidence from being introduced.
54
While this article focuses on trials as the medium for this discussion of the role of empathy in
the practice of law, the underlying themes this article seeks to explore are applicable to all aspects of
law practice.
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manifestations of the medieval trial-by-combat, lawyers for all sides in a conflict55
construct narratives from the testimony and other introduced evidence that are
designed to persuade the fact-finders to decide in their clients’ favor.
The idea that a trial is a highly formalized forum for story-telling appears to be
generally accepted.56 Although lawyers have their own term for the story they
intend to tell – the “theory of the case” – the essential elements of the process
should be recognizable to any storyteller:
A theory is worth arguing if it stands a significant chance of being
adopted by the judge or jury who must adjudicate the dispute. The
more a theory satisfies the following criteria, the greater its chances of
adoption.
1. Does the theory “[a]ccount for or explain all of . . . the undeniable
facts?” . . .
2. Does the theory “explain away in a plausible manner as many
unfavorable facts as it can”? . . .
3. Does the theory “[e]xplain why people acted in the way they did”?
...
4. Is the theory “supported by the details”? . . .
5. Does the theory have a solid basis in law? . . .
6. Is the theory “consistent with common sense and . . . plausible”?57
The limits of a trial’s storytelling universe are defined by ethics, on the one hand,58
and the applicable rules of evidence, and the court’s rulings on evidence and
testimony, on the other. Within the boundaries of that universe, though, lawyers

Most evocations of trials presuppose the simple X v. Y model, and this article will largely do
so as well. But we should not ignore the increasingly common complex civil case in which there can
be multiple parties on either side of the “v.”.
56
See, e.g. Mauet, supra n. 31, at 27 (Effective storytelling is the basis for much of what occurs
during a trial, including the opening statement, direct examinations, and closing arguments.” Small
wonder, them, that good lawyers are invariably good storytellers.”)
57
Neumann, supra. n. 52, at 296-97 (citations omitted).
58
For a stimulating discussion of the ethical boundaries of what has been termed “applied legal
storytelling,” see Steven J. Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist?: An Essay on the Ethical
Limits of Applied Legal Storytelling 7 J ALWD 63 (2010).
55
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are free to use all narrative and rhetorical devices available to them to present their
case theory to the jury in the best possible light for their client.59
Often overlooked in descriptions of the trial process, however, is the fact that a
lawyer’s case theory is not presented in a vacuum. Instead, it is presented as one of
at least two theories, each of which is constructed on the same criteria as those
outlined above.60 And one of the ways a trial can be viewed is as a tournament at
which champions – in the form of opposing case theories, or narratives, created by
the attorneys – duel for the jury’s approval and acceptance.61 The jury is told about
the characteristics each champion will possess during preliminary statements,
observes the construction of these champions during the evidentiary stage of trial,
and is introduced to the fully-formed champion during closing arguments, but the
duel itself does not (or should not) begin until the jury has had the rules of this
particular tournament explained to them, in the form of the court’s instructions on
the law, and retires to the jury room to deliberate.62 As it turns out, though, the
two champions are not the only competitors in the tournament, just the two that the
lawyers get to see.
The process by which a jury reaches its verdict has been modeled by Reid Hastie
and Nancy Pennington, who have coined the term “Explanation-based Decision
Making” to describe their conclusions.63 According to this model, the duel between
Two recent articles discuss the unease some feel about the use of narrative and rhetoric in
the legal process. See, Johansen, supra n. 58, at 63-4 (“. . . I have been struck by a recurring sense of
unease when the conversation turns to Applied Legal Storytelling. We all recognize, perhaps
intuitively, that stories are powerful. But the unease comes from a concern that they may be too
powerful, or perhaps inappropriately powerful.”); J. Christopher Rideout, Penumbral Thinking
Revisited: Metaphor in Legal Argumentation, 7 J ALWD 155, 156 (2010)(noting that Judge Cardozo
“warned that although metaphors in the law can ‘liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.’”),
quoting, Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926). Both writers conclude, however,
that these techniques are and should be available for legal argumentation: “[C]loser inspection of
[legal] ethical concerns shows that storytelling is consistent with our existing norms about the
ethical practice of law.” Johansen, 7 J ALWD at 64; “Metaphors are central to legal thinking, and,
by adding flexibility, they help law accommodate complexity and change in human social
experience.” Rideout, 7 J ALWD at 190.
60
As Mauet notes, this is usually true in civil trials and is often true in criminal cases. Mauet,
supra n. 31, at 24. In criminal cases, however, the defense might offer a theory based on “the
existence of reasonable doubt and . . . not [on] a competing version of reality.” Id.
61
Clients, whose assets, liberty, or – in the case of criminal prosecutions – desire for
punishment, are at stake during trial, are likely to hold a more prosaic view of the nature of a trial.
62
Juries are constantly warned during trial to not deliberate on the evidence or to start
weighing their verdicts until all the evidence has been presented and until they are instructed on the
law by the judge. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions, § 2.05
(1997)(“Each of you must keep an open mind throughout the trial. In the oath you just took you
swore to do so. You should avoid forming opinions about the guilt or innocence of the defendant or
about any other disputed question until the trial is ended and you begin your deliberations.”)
63
Reid Hastie and Nancy Pennington, The O.J. Simpson Stories: Behavioral Scientists’
Reflections on The People of the State of California v. Orenthal James Simpson, 67 U. Col. L. Rev.
59
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the competing trial narratives is an intertextual, or internarrative one,64 in which
meaning is generated by the relationship of one case narrative to the other and –
crucially – by additional inferences transported into the jury room by the jurors
themselves.
The juror’s “explanation” of legal evidence takes the form of a “story” in
which causal and intentional relations among events are prominent. . .
. The story is constructed both from information presented at trial and
from the juror’s background knowledge. Two kinds of background
knowledge are critical: (1) expectations about what makes a complete
story and (2) knowledge about events similar to those that are central
in the case. . . . The story constructed by the juror will consist of some
subset of the events and causal relationships referred to in the
presentation of evidence, as well as additional events and causal
relationships inferred by the juror. Some of these inferences may be
suggested by the attorneys and some may be constructed solely by the
juror. Whatever their source, the inferences will serve to fill out the
episode structure of the story. This constructive mental activity
results in one or more interpretations of the evidence that have a
narrative story form.65

957, 957 (1996). Hastie and Pennington’s theories are more fully explained in Nancy Pennington &
Reid Hastie, A Theory of Explanation-Based Decision Making, in DECISION MAKING IN ACTION:
MODELS AND METHODS 188 (Gary A. Klein et al. eds., 1993).
64
I have stolen “intertextuality” from the world of postmodernist literary theory and have
shamelessly modified it to create the concept of “internarrativity” because trials, as opposed to
motions and appellate practice, contain no formal, written, texts. I merely intend to import the
concept of intertextuality, not any of the additional postmodernist baggage it might attempt to bring
with it. For a discussion of the role of intertextuality in the construction of knowledge during the
reading of legal texts, see James F. Stratman, When Law Students Read Cases: Exploring Relations
Between Professional Legal Reasoning Roles and Problem Detection 34 Discourse Processes 57
(2002).
65
Hastie and Pennington, supra n. 63, at 960. See also, Marianne Wesson, That’s My Story
And I’m Stickin’ To It . . .: The Jury As Fifth Business In The Trial Of O.J. Simpson And Other
Matters, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 949, 954 (1996)(“I am suggesting that the juror is more storyteller than
historian. He seeks narrative truth, rather than historical truth . . . . Juries that behave like
storytellers’ collectives, as opposed to historians’ collectives, may be more prevalent now than at
times in the past, but I believe that it is not identity politics but other aspects of our culture that
create in jurors this view of what is expected of them. Late-twentieth-century cultural productions
often place creative demands on the reader or viewer, requiring her to impose an order on a chaotic
stream of images and information.”) Mauet, surprisingly, appears to miss the inevitability of the
jury’s story creation. He believes that lawyers can prevent the jury from engaging in this activity,
observing that “[i]f lawyers do not organize the evidence into a clear, simple story, jurors will do so
on their own.” Mauet, supra n. 31, at 26.
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Difficult as it might be for lawyers to hear that the results of the jury room
narrative tournament are, in part, out of their control, we should not be too
surprised at Hastie and Pennington’s conclusions. We know from the list of criteria
for a viable case theory that “common sense” is a crucial part of the narrative’s
armament and trial attorneys are familiar with the standard court instruction that
requires jurors to use their common sense when considering the evidence.66 Hastie
and Pennington’s model of jury decision making merely confirms that juries take
this instruction seriously.
The jury-constructed narrative is defined, or “framed,”67 by the jury’s cultural
experience and is, perhaps, best thought of as the jury’s cultural narrative, the third
narrative – after the two constructed by the lawyers – to influence the trial’s
outcome. Accordingly, in addition to constructing the narrative that explains the
trial evidence in the best light for their clients, trial lawyers must equip their
narratives with the ability to engage and co-opt the jury’s cultural narrative. The
trial narrative that can best ally itself to the jury’s narrative will doubtless be the
one to win the duel and return victorious from the jury’s deliberations.
It is in this part of the trial attorney’s work that storytelling techniques can be
particularly helpful. As Ruth Anne Robbins has observed,
[b]ecause people respond – instinctively and intuitively – to certain
recurring story patterns and character archetypes, lawyers should
systematically and deliberately integrate into their storytelling the
larger picture of their clients’ goals by subtly portraying their
individual clients as heroes on a particular life path. This strategy is
not merely a device to make the story more interesting, but provides a
scaffold to influence the judge at the unconscious level by providing a
metaphor for universal theories of struggle and growth.68
See, e.g. NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2:320 (Action for Wrongful Death and
Conscious Pain – Actions Commenced on or after July 26, 2003) (“Taking into account all the factors
I have discussed, you must use your own common sense and sound judgment based on the evidence
in determining the amount of the economic loss suffered by [the claimant].”)
67
Literary theorists use the term “frame” to mean “the cognitive model that is selected and
used (and sometimes discarded) in the process of reading a narrative text.” Manfred Jahn, Frames,
Preferences, and the Reading of Third-Person Narratives: Towards a Cognitive Narratology, 18
Poetics Today 441, 442 (1997). For a discussion of framing theory applied to the law, see Judith
Fisher, Framing Gender: Federal Appellate Judges’ Choices About Gender-Neutral Language, 43 U.
S.F. L. Rev. 473 (2009). Quoting Erving Gottman, Fisher defines frames as “schemata of
interpretation through which users locate, perceive, identify, and label experience,” and goes on to
explain that frames are “mental structures, similar to picture frames, which define the perimeters of
each individual’s unique focus.” Id. at 484, quoting ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY
ON ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE 21 (1974).
68
Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client’s Story
Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypical Hero’s Journey 29 Seattle L. Rev. 767, 768-9
66
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The concept of metaphor is crucial here, because it is metaphor – and the other
rhetorical devices available to practitioners – that allow lawyers to relocate the
facts of a specific case into the realm of the jury’s cultural narrative. And the
selection of metaphors, and the other rhetorical devices lawyers use to persuade
juries, is an act that must be undertaken with a great deal of empathetic
sensitivity. Metaphors act as a translation matrix, allowing square-shaped facts to
connect to the round hole of cultural narrative, thereby ensuring a snug fit between
the two worlds.69 In this sense, a lawyer’s challenge is much like that of the ground
crew during the Apollo 13 flight, devising a way for the command module’s square
air-scrubbing cartridges to fit into the lunar module’s round air purification system
in order to process the toxic gasses out of the system, leaving only breathable air.70
C.

Interlude

Well, that didn’t work at all. I know that as writer and reader, we are engaged in
an asynchronous dialog,71 but I am confident that whenever in the future you read
this, your reaction to the end of the previous section was, at its most benign,
surprise at the analogy I attempted to draw.
The Apollo 13 analogy is intentionally dreadful. It wrenches the article from a
discussion of cultural narratives and their role in deciding trials and relocates it
somewhere in outer space, and it makes reference to an event that, aside from those
few of you who are devotees of America’s manned space program in the 1960s and
‘70s (or have a memory of the movie, starring Tom Hanks72), has no context or
meaning for readers of this piece.
And there lies the lawyering problem at the heart of this article, because the Apollo
13 analogy is an entirely logical way of describing the role metaphor and rhetoric
play in the construction of knowledge that happens during jury deliberation, yet it
was apparently selected with such a disregard of empathy towards my audience
that it likely failed utterly to persuade you of the point I was apparently trying to

(2006). Robbins is writing here of written storytelling techniques used to influence a court, but the
principal applies at least as well to the oral narrative of the courtroom.
69
This gross oversimplification of metaphor’s nature and function will doubtless set many
rhetoricians’ teeth on edge. For a helpful and substantially more nuanced discussion of the nature of
metaphor, see Rideout, supra n. 59, at 160-71.
70
For a description of this remarkable feat of engineering, see, ANDREW CHAIKIN, A MAN ON
THE MOON, 315-6 (1994).
71
See, e.g., JOHN R. TRIMBLE, WRITING WITH STYLE: CONVERSATIONS ON THE ART OF WRITING, 5
(2d ed. 2000)(“Far from writing in a vacuum, [the writer] is conversing, in a very real sense, even
though that person – like you – may be hours, or days, or even years away in time.”)
72
Apollo 13 (Universal Pictures 1995) (motion picture).
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make.73 We know that metaphor and other rhetorical devices must be appropriate
to their audience in order to be effective,74 but if lawyers have difficulty
empathizing with their audiences the results could be disastrous for their clients. If
logical metaphors can backfire so horribly under the controlled conditions of an
article, the consequences can be even more severe in the courtroom. The problems
such a failure of empathy can cause, and the benefits of a well-developed
empathetic sense, are what we will consider next.
D.

O. J. Simpson, Vioxx, and Max Steur: Two Failed
Trial Strategies and One Success in Trial Tactics

Enough has been written about the O. J. Simpson trial, in both the popular press
and the scholarly world of law review articles, to contribute, in a modest way, to
deforestation and global warming.75 Without wishing to make the problem worse,
the Simpson trial gives us an excellent example of what can happen when nonempathetic litigators fail to calibrate their trial strategy to the jury’s cultural
narrative.

For those who do not know the story, here, in a nutshell, is the context that was so woefully
lacking in the body of the article. The Apollo 13 mission of April, 1970 came near to disaster after an
explosion in the spacecraft’s service module caused a loss of power and oxygen to the command
module, in which the three astronauts were intended to travel during the flight to the moon.
Chaikin, supra n. 70, at 285-94. Because of the lack of power in the command module, the crew was
forced to move to the lunar module, the craft intended to carry two astronauts to the moon’s surface
and back to the command module. Id. at 299. Unfortunately, the presence of three people, instead of
two, for a substantially longer period than had been planned, threatened to cause the lunar module’s
carbon dioxide filtering system to overload, which would cause a fatal buildup of carbon dioxide
before the astronauts could return to earth. Id. at 315. The command module had sufficient
canisters of lithium hydroxide, the substance used to filter carbon dioxide from the air, but these
canisters were square-shaped, and the lunar module’s environmental control system could only
accept round-shaped canisters. Id. NASA engineers in Houston devised a connecting device that
would allow the square canisters to fit snugly into the round environmental control system by using
material available to the astronauts, including tape, socks, and cardboard notebook covers. Id. at
320. The device worked, and the astronauts returned safely to earth.
74
See, e.g., MICHAEL SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN
PERSUASIVE WRITING, 210 (2002)(“Legal writers should also avoid using arcane or esoteric
metaphoric references. For a metaphor to be effective, it must be based on well-known concepts
easily evoked in the mind of the reader.”) My Apollo 13 reference certainly fails this test. See also,
Bruce Ching, Argument, Analogy, and Audience: Using Persuasive Comparisons while Avoiding
Unintended Effects, 7 J ALWD 313, 315-317 (2010)(discussing appropriately effective use of biblical
imagery in the southeastern United States during the trial of Elvis Presley’s doctor).
75
This would traditionally be the place to include a list of at least some of the articles and
books written about the Simpson trial. To do a creditable job of this, however, would be to clog-up
this article with a multiple page footnote that would add nothing to its purpose. In that footnote’s
place, let me suggest that anyone interested in literature on the trial go to LexisNexis or Westlaw
and search the legal journals databases for articles with the words “O.J. Simpson” in the title. They
will not be disappointed in the volume of reading material.
73
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Less has been written about the 2005 Vioxx trial, Ernst v. Merck, in which a
plaintiff’s verdict for $253 million was vacated by the Texas Court of Appeals.76
This trial, though, offers another object lesson in a familiar logical, non-empathetic,
and failed, strategy – that a dry emphasis on the failure of the plaintiffs’ case to
establish causation, a necessary but technical element in tort liability, would be a
sufficient defense to a highly emotional case.
Max Steur is mostly forgotten today, although Irving Younger notes that “[m]any
who knew him and saw him work say that he may have been the greatest [trial]
lawyer of his generation.”77 Retained by the defendants in the prosecution that
arose from the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire, Steur’s cross-examination of Kate
Alterman, a young woman who worked at the Triangle Shirtwaist Company’s
factory and who was one of the few survivors of that horrific event, is a textbook
example of tactical empathy employed by a lawyer. Steur listened to not just the
logical implications of Alterman’s testimony, but also to how she delivered her
testimony. Realizing that her testimony had likely been coached, and needing to
discredit her without appearing to bully an intensely sympathetic witness, Steuer
conducted what Younger described as “[p]robably his most celebrated crossexamination”78 and perhaps one of the finest examples of cross-examination in the
trial canon.
Taken together, the Simpson and Vioxx cases suggest some fundamental flaws in
the logical approach to case theory that should cause concern who believe that
“thinking like a lawyer” is an adequate goal for lawyers who seek to communicate
with non-lawyers, while the Steur cross-examination points out the importance of a
less logical, more empathetic, style of practical lawyering.

One article that focuses, in part, on this particular Vioxx case is Johansen, supra n. 58, at 7781. That article, in turn, owes much to Roger Parloff, Stark Choices at the First Vioxx Trial,
Fortune (July 15, 2005)(available at http://www.sociablemedia.com/PDF/fortune_jul_15_05.pdf).
Much of the discussion here will be drawn from the Johansen article. For a discussion of the broader
Vioxx litigation, see, Frank M. McClellan, The Vioxx Litigation: A Critical Look at Trial Tactics, the
Tort System, and the Roles of Lawyers in Mass Tort Litigation, 57 DePaul L.Rev. 509 (2008). See
also, Michael E. Tigar, The Vioxx Litigation: Two Case Studies in, Trial Stories (Michael E. Tigar &
Angela J. Davis, editors) (2008).
77
Irving Younger, Foreword to Max Steuer’s Cross Examination of Kate Alterman in People v.
Harris & Blank, 1 (1987).
78
Id.
76
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1.

O. J. Simpson and Domestic Violence

The facts of the Simpson trial79 are sufficiently well-known to only require
sketching here. On June 12, 1994, Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman
were found, stabbed to death, in Brentwood, California.80 Ms. Simpson’s former
husband, Orenthal James (“O. J.) Simpson was arrested for the murders on June 17
and subsequently tried. 81 The first day of trial was January 24, 1995,82 the
prosecution rested its case on July 6,83 and Simpson was found not guilty on
October 3, 1995.84
The prosecution’s theory rested, in part, on a history of domestic violence between
Simpson and Ms. Simpson.85 Simpson’s tendency to violence towards Ms. Simpson
was exacerbated by a series of incidents on June 12, ran the prosecution theory, and
led directly to her murder and the murder of the man she was with at the time
Simpson encountered her.86 This was, the prosecution argued, a case in which
domestic violence had reached its terrible, but logical, conclusion.
The defense offered several alternative theories throughout the trial.87 It floated a
theory that Ms. Simpson and Goldman were murdered by drug-dealers or their
associates, either because of mistaken identity or because one or both of the victims
was involved in “drug-related activities.”88 The defense also proposed a theory to
explain the prosecution’s extensive scientific evidence that, in essence, relied on the
Los Angeles Police Department’s incompetence in gathering evidence.89 Most
There have been enough Simpson trials by this point that I should probably clarify that by
“the Simpson trial” I mean the criminal trial for the murders of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald
Goldman.
80
ROBERT L. SHAPIRO, THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE: A DEFENSE ATTORNEY’S BRIEF ON THE O.J.
SIMPSON CASE, vii (1996).
81
Id.
82
Id., at viii Determining when the trial began is more difficult than it might appear. Pre-trial
motions took several months, jury selection began on September 26 and took five weeks to complete,
and the jury itself was sequestered on January 11. Id.
83
Id., at ix.
84
Id., at x.
85
Hastie and Pennington, supra n. 63, at 964.
86
Id.
87
The defense strategy here was in flagrant violation of one of the central principles of case
theory development; that the case theory should be firmly in place well before trial begins. See, e.g.,
Mauet, supra n. 31, at 491 (“When discovery is completed, you should have a good grasp of the
undisputed evidence, where the evidence is in dispute, and what the key factual disputes are. By
this time, and before you begin other trial preparation, you must decide on what your theory of the
case will be, because your trial preparation needs to focus on proving your theory and discrediting
your opponent’s theory.”) The “dream team” assembled in Simpson’s defense strayed far from this
classic, structured, formula, more closely resembling a group of improvising jazz musicians.
88
Hastie and Pennington, supra. n. 63, at 966
89
Id., at 967.
79
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memorably, the defense also attacked the credibility and motivation of a Los
Angeles Police Department detective – Mark Fuhrman – who was, asserted the
defense, a racist officer who reached the decision that Simpson had committed the
murders and who manufactured evidence to ensure his conviction.
The prosecution’s theory failed utterly with the jury. The jury only deliberated for
approximately three hours – after more than eight months of trial – before
returning with its verdict of not guilty on both murder counts.90 And comments
made by some jury members after the trial made clear that the prosecution’s
“domestic abuse” theory was spectacularly unsuccessful. One juror noted that
“[t]his was a murder trial, not domestic abuse. If you want to get tried for domestic
abuse, go in another courtroom and get tried for that.”91 A second juror stated “I
could not lay a heavy consideration [on it] as far as that being a motive. I feel that
if a person is capable of extreme rage, then those types of things happen a bit more
often than maybe once every four or five years.”92 A third juror commented that
“the information [the prosecution] gave us about that period of spousal abuse was
really not enough information to indicate that this man had built up all this rage
over all this time.”93 And a fourth juror said “What they presented to me [about the
previous domestic violence], well, I related it all to they had been drinking. . . . But
I didn’t think it was necessarily a motive for murder.”94
The jury’s verdict was heavily criticized in the aftermath of the Simpson trial. In
one survey conducted less than six months after the Simpson verdict, 70% of
respondents rated Judge Ito’s performance as good or excellent, 79% rated Marcia
Clark’s performance the same way, 58% rated Johnny Cochran’s performance as

Id., at 976.
Id., at 971, quoting, Bob Pool & Amy Pyle, Case was Weak, Race Not a Factor, Two Jurors
Say, L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1995, at A6.
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good or excellent, while only 30% rated the jury’s performance that way.95 Others
have classified the Simpson verdict as an example of jury nullification.96
Jury nullification is, of course, the ultimate triumph of “feeling” over “thinking,”97
which is perhaps why it so anathematic to many lawyers.98 Certainly the notion of
jury nullification – of a jury ignoring the hermetic world of admissible evidence and
controlled discourse in a trial and instead allowing themselves to be influenced by

Gerald F. Uelmen, Jury-Bashing and the O.J. Simpson Verdict 20 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y
475, 475 (1997), quoting A Survey of the Citrus Municipal Court District (“Citrus Court Survey”)
(Nat’l Demographics Corp., Claremont, California), January 18-19, 1996, at tbls. 2—4, 6. The
judgment of a group, 79% of whom felt the losing prosecutor did a good job and only 58% of whom felt
the prevailing defense attorney did a good job, might legitimately be called into question. And the
inherent conservatism of the group was revealed by other answers in the survey: 55% identified
themselves as Republican, 59% described themselves as “conservative,” and 15% as “very
conservative,” and when asked whether California “should make convicted criminals do manual
labor in chain-gangs, 74% expressed agreement.” Id., at 475, quoting Citrus Court Survey, at tbls.
53-54, 34.
96
See, e.g.: Andrew G.T. Moore II, The O.J. Simpson Trial – Triumph of Justice or Debacle?,
41 St. Louis U. L.J. 9, 20 (1996)(“By insinuating a racist police plot to frame O.J. Simpson, the
defense had all the ammunition it needed for an act of nullification)(citation omitted); Bryan
Morgan, The Jury’s View, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 983, 983 (1996)(“. . . I am drawn to the unpleasant
conclusion that racial bias – the controlling influence of race on one’s actions – was the principal, and
probably the dispositive, reason for the Simpson acquittal); W. William Hodes, Lord Brougham, The
Dram Team, and Jury Nullification of the Third Kind, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1075, 1079 (1996)(In the
Simpson trial, “the defense lawyers were able to induce even the jurors who harbored no doubts –
and certainly no reasonable doubts – about whether O.J. Simpson actually ‘did it,’ to vote for
acquittal anyway, as a matter of long-term justice”). Others disagree. See, e.g.: Hastie and
Pennington, supra n. 63, at 976 (“We see on clear indication that the jury deliberately nullified the
law and disregarded its fact-finding task to send a message to majority white America or to the
LAPD.”)(citation omitted); Uelmen, supra n. 95, at 478 (“. . . the verdict . . . was not jury
nullification.” Uelman was a member of the Simpson defense team, and his opinion should be read
in that context); Justice Rebecca Love Kourlis, Not Jury Nullification; Not a Call for Ethical
Reform; But Rather a Case for Judicial Control, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1109, 1117 (1996)(“Because
Cochran’s main arguments were based on assessing the credibility and reliability of the evidence, I
do not believe Cochran stepped over the bounds of ethics to argue jury nullification.”)
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To reprise, the difference between those identified as “thinkers” and as ‘”feelers” is not based
on the ultimate decision the individual might take, but rather on “the justifications, bases, or
reasons one articulates for one’s decisions.” Daicoff, supra, n. 27, at 113. As an example of the
distinction between the two states, Daicoff quotes two questions designed to locate a responder on
the thinking/feeling continuum: “[One] sample question is: ‘Is it better to be (a) just; or (b) merciful?
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their general sense of what the “proper” result should be99 – would be almost
inconceivable to a law student, who has spent the first year of legal study being told
to shut out all outside influences and make evaluations and decisions solely on the
basis of legal doctrine. Yet the existence of such a concept stands as a powerful
symbol for the proposition that lawyers and non-lawyers can, and frequently do,
think very differently about the same set of facts.
The Simpson trial was so extensive and excessive that it can stand as an example of
almost anything anyone wants to prove. For our purposes, it serves as an example
of a fundamental misjudgment of a jury by a group of prosecutors; a failure of
empathy by prosecutors who did not understand the jury to whom they were
arguing. As Hastie and Pennington note in their brief review of the trial, the
prosecution “sought to present a single, linear story.”100 The prosecution’s fatal
error was in selecting when to begin that story. By delving back into Simpson’s
relationship with his ex-wife, and by attempting to define the nature of that
relationship, between an African-American man and a White woman, as one of
domestic violence – with the murders as the logical conclusion of that violence – the
prosecution tied itself to a complicated narrative that was replete with cultural,
gender, and racial overtones.101
At least one report of the prosecution’s reasons for selecting the story they told to
the jury describes the lead prosecutor, Marcia Clark, as saying
she preferred to have black women over black men on the jury, because
culturally it is known that domestic abuse is more prevalent in black
households than in white families. Her thinking was that black
women were becoming more liberated, were fed up with being beaten,
An example of a juror’s unwillingness to act as an unthinking balancer of carefully selected
evidence can be found in Marianne Wesson’s description of the Public Broadcasting System’s
documentary, Inside the Jury, in which “one juror suggests that really the evidence and the court’s
instructions leave no room for an outcome other than guilty [and] another actually growls ‘I am not a
computer.’” Wesson, supra n. 65, at 952, quoting, Inside the Jury Room (PBS television broadcast,
1986).
100
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101
An abbreviated list of articles that center on the issues flowing from the prosecution’s
domestic violence story includes: Devon W. Carbado, The Construction of O.J. Simpson as a Racial
Victim, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 49 (1997); Myrna S. Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword:
Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome By and Against Batterers in Cases Implicating Domestic
Violence, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 789 (1996); Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of
Domestic Violence: . . . Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1463 (1996); Nancy S. Ehrenreich,
O.J. Simpson & the Myth of Gender/Race Conflict, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 931 (1996); Cheryl I. Harris,
Myths of Race and Gender in the Trials of O.J. Simpson and Susan Smith – Spectacles of Our Times,
35 Washburn L.J. 225 (1996); Leonard M. Baynes, A Time to Kill, The O.J. Simpson Trials, and
Storytelling to Juries, 17 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 549, 563 (1997); Sheri L. Burr, O.J. As a Tale of 2
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would identify with Nicole, and would be angry with Simpson for
having brutalized her.102
These opinions, reportedly expressed in conversations between Ms. Clark and Dr.
Donald Vinson of DecisionQuest, a jury consulting firm that advised the Simpson
prosecution team briefly during jury selection,103 were contradicted by polls
conducted by DecisionQuest, which indicated that “while 23 percent of black males
thought Simpson was guilty, only 7 percent of black women thought so.104 In
additional research conducted by DecisionQuest, African-American women
indicated that the reports of Simpson’s domestic violence were “simply not a big
deal.”105 These results were apparently consistent with the research conducted by
the defense’s jury consultant.106
It is always easy, of course, to criticize a decision after its results are known. And
there were enough other moments in the trial that might have led any jury to
conclude that the prosecution had failed to prove Simpson’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt that it is impossible to say, with certainty, that Clark’s misreading of the jury’s response to the domestic abuse evidence on which the
prosecution relied, or her unwillingness to consider the jury consultant’s
suggestions that a jury composed as was the Simpson jury would be unlikely to
convict based on a domestic violence theory, was the cause of Simpson’s acquittal.107
What seems certain, though, is that Clark made what other lawyers might consider
to be a logical rather than an empathetic assumption – that women, who are likely
to be the victims of domestic violence,108 would be offended by the evidence showing
Simpson to be an abuser and would draw from that evidence the logical conclusion
that Simpson had progressed from abuser to murderer – and that this assumption

VINCENT BUGLIOSI, OUTRAGE: THE FIVE REASONS WHY O.J. SIMPSON GOT AWAY WITH
MURDER , 94 (1996).
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DecisionQuest prepared graphics and courtroom displays for the prosecution throughout the
trial, but only participated in two days of the jury selection process. Id., at 93-4.
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was entirely incorrect. Clark thought like a lawyer, and as a result, failed
accurately to gauge the jury’s response to the evidence.109
2.

Vioxx and a Failure to Show Causation

The lawyers representing Merck Pharmaceuticals (“Merck”) made a similar error
during the Ernst trial.110 At issue in the case was whether Vioxx, a pain reliever
produced by Merck, had caused Bob Ernst to suffer a fatal heart attack.111 Vioxx
was approved for marketing in 2000 and quickly developed a significant share of the
painkiller market.112 Concerns over Vioxx’s possible connection to heart illness
grew over the time it was on the market, prompting one law firm to have filed over
300 lawsuits even before the drug was withdrawn after studies demonstrated a link
between it and a significant increase in the risk of heart attacks.113 The specific
danger posed by Vioxx was an increased risk of blood clots which could lead to
sudden heart attacks.114
Bob Ernst was an apparently healthy and active 59 year old man who took Vioxx for
arthritis pain in his hands.115 Some months after beginning a Vioxx regimen, Mr.
Ernst died after suffering a heart attack.116 Mr. Ernst’s autopsy revealed that he
had suffered from hardening of the arteries, and that his heart attack had been
caused by arrhythmia.117
The strategies for both sides in the litigation were easy to predict. W. Mark Lanier,
the plaintiff’s lawyer
developed characters: the innocent Ernst, struck down in the prime of
life; and the money-grubbing Merck, more concerned with profit than
safety. On the other hand, [Merck’s lawyer, David C. Kiernan,]
presented scientific evidence showing the link between Vioxx was no
greater than similar links between heart attacks and other drugs,
including ibuprofen. He showed that Ernst died from arrhythmia –

For a more detailed analysis of the Simpson litigation by an experienced criminal defense
attorney, see Angela J. Davis, The People v. Orenthal James Simpson: Race and Trial Advocacy in
Trial Stories, supra n. 76, at 283-352.
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and that taking Vioxx presented no known increased risk of
arrhythmia.118
In short, the plaintiff’s lawyer put the drug on trial for causing “heart attacks,” and
Merck on trial for being a “profit-driven giant corporation whose pursuit of profits
ultimately killed [Mr. Ernst],” who had died of a heart attack after taking Vioxx.119
Merck defended by seeking to prove that while Vioxx might have caused “heart
attacks,” it didn’t cause Mr. Ernst’s heart attack, relying on technical terms like
“’NSAIDS’ and ‘coxibs’ and ‘cardiothromboembolic’ events [and] on corporate
documents full of similar medical jargon.”120
Viewed logically, and based on the law, Merck appeared to have by far the stronger
case. Causation, as any first year law student knows after studying torts, is a
crucial element in any personal injury claim.121 Yet in the Ernst case, the only
evidence the plaintiff could offer to support causation was the testimony of Dr.
Maria Araneta the medical examiner who had conducted the autopsy.122 Dr.
Araneta testified that while she had found no blood clot (a crucial finding because,
as both parties agreed, blood clots that led to myocardial infarctions were the only
risk posed by Vioxx) during her autopsy, “it was possible that Ernst died of a blood
clot that was dissipated during CPR.”123 With this as the only evidence offered to
establish causation, it seems likely that a substantial majority of law students
confronted with the facts of the Ernst litigation would conclude that it was an easy
hypothetical: the defendant would prevail.
In fact, however, the jury awarded the plaintiff $253 million, “including $229
million in punitive damages.”124 When the case was later considered by a panel of
judges, however, the court vacated the jury’s award and entered a defense
verdict.125 The court dismissed the ‘dissipated blood clot’ possibility offered by Dr.
Araneta as “mere ‘speculation’” and concluded, as we might expect from a group of
lawyers, that there was no evidence of causation, and therefore no liability.126
Id., at 78-9. For portions of Lanier’s opening statement to the jury, see Michel E. Tigar, The
Vioxx Litigation, supra n. 76, at 404-407.
119
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120
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In his analysis of the conflicting trial strategies, Johansen concluded that while the
plaintiff’s attorney was “weaving a compelling story,” the defense attorney “failed to
develop the story of his client.”127 Johansen dismissed the possibility that the
plaintiff’s “two-pronged emotional appeal – an innocent person died, and a greedy
drug company ignored potential safety concerns to make greater profits”128 had
caused the jury to overlook the problems with the evidence establishing causation,
noting that the adversarial system allowed the defense to counter the plaintiff’s
narrative, and concluded that the Ernst jury verdict was a triumph of more effective
storytelling.129
As in the Simpson case, one cannot know for certain to what extent the defense
strategy caused Merck to lose the Ernst trial.130 Certainly, the Vioxx litigation was
not a guaranteed loser for the defense; Merck finally settled the Vioxx litigation
after contesting fourteen trials, resulting in five plaintiffs verdicts and nine verdicts
in favor of the defense.131 Whether those defense verdicts were obtained as a result
of different geographical or other, non-evidentiary, reasons, or were the result of
different facts, or of different strategies, is not, and cannot be, known.132

Johansen, supra n. 58, at 79.
Id. at 80.
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We can, though, acknowledge that the defense strategy in Ernst, like Clark’s
domestic violence strategy in the Simpson case, was a logical, rational strategy,
based on the facts of the case and that both represent a failure of empathy, in that
neither strategy spoke to the jury’s cultural narrative of Merck as a representative
of “big pharma,” whereas the strategies employed by opposing counsel in both
Simpson and Ernst were directed specifically at the jury’s narrative. And while two
cases, plucked from the millions of civil and criminal trials tried over the years,
cannot stand definitively for anything, the failure of the “logical” strategy in both
cases at least suggests the possibility that the rational, logical approach
characterized by the concept of “thinking like a lawyer” might not always be the
most effective way to communicate with those who have not been trained to think
the same way. Perhaps what is needed from lawyers is a more empathetic response
to both the facts and those being asked to consider and rule on them.
3.

The Triangle Shirtwaist Trial
and The Tactical Use of Empathy

Although trial lawyers must develop strong strategic skills that allow them to map
out case narratives that will engage and persuade juries, they must also develop a
strong tactical sense that will allow them to understand the nuances of testimony as
it comes in during a trial, and must be able to understand how to exploit any
possible advantages to their clients offered by such nuances. An empathetic
response is just as important in this tactical stage as it is when developing the
strategy for the overall trial.
Max Steuer, counsel for the defendants in the Triangle Shirtwaist fire prosecution,
gives us a flawless example of situational, or tactical, empathy, both in his
immediate understanding of the possible advantages offered to his case by the
prosecution’s star witness and in his sensitive handling of the witness to achieve the
best result for his clients.
The facts of the tragic Triangle Shirtwaist fire case are easily given. The Triangle
Waist Company was the largest manufacturer of women’s blouses in New York
City.133 The company occupied three floors of the Asch Building, located near
Washington Place.134 On Saturday, March 25, 1911, at the end of the workday,135 a
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fire broke out on the cutting room floor.136 The fire spread quickly, and one hundred
forty-six people were killed, many of whom – in a scene familiar to anyone who
witnessed the September 11, 2001 destruction of the World Trade Center buildings
– died while jumping from the building to escape the flames.137
The furor that resulted from the tragedy led to criminal prosecutions of the owners
of the Triangle Waist Company, Isaac Harris and Max Blank, for misdemeanor
manslaughter.138 The prosecution’s theory was that the defendants had caused one
of the loft exit doors to be locked, thereby preventing at least some of the victims
from escaping the fire.139 Accordingly, it was crucial for the prosecution to be able
to establish that at least one victim of the fire had died as a direct result of the door
being locked.140 The prosecutor’s found one such victim – Margaret Schwartz – and
found a witness – Kate Alterman – who could testify that Schwartz had died
because the door was locked.141
Little is known of Kate Alterman with certainty. She appears to have been the
daughter of Morris Alterman who emigrated from Russia to Philadelphia in 1903,142
and testified in strongly-accented English.143 How she found herself to be working
at the Triangle Waist Company on March 25, 1911 is unknown, but that she was
there was beyond doubt to anyone who heard her testimony.
The simplest way to understand what the jurors, and Max Steuer, heard from Kate
Alterman is to reproduce verbatim a portion of her direct examination.
Q.

Margaret Swartz [sic.] was with you at this time?

A.

At this time, yes sir.

Q.

Then where did you go?

A.
Then I went to the toilet room, Margaret disappeared from me,
and I wanted to go up Greene Street side, but the whole door was in
flames, so I went and hide myself in the toilet rooms, and then I went
out right away from the toilet rooms and bent my face over the sink,
and then I ran to the Washington side elevator, but there was a big
Id., at 117.
Id., at 167.
138
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139
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crowd and I couldn’t pass through there. Then I noticed some one
[sic.], a whole crowd, around the door, and I saw Bernstein, the
manager’s brother trying to open the door, and there was Margaret
near him. Bernstein tried the door, he couldn’t open it, and then
Margaret began to open that door. I take her on one side – I pushed
her on the side and I said, “Wait, I will open that door.” I tried, I
pulled the handle in and out, all ways, and I couldn’t open it. She
pushed me on the other side, got hold of the handle and then she tried.
And then I saw her bending down on her knees, and her hair was
loose, and the trail of her dress was a little far from her, and then a big
smoke came, and I couldn’t see, I just know it was Margaret, and I said
“Margaret,” and she didn’t reply. I left Margaret, I turned my head on
the side, and I noticed the trail of her dress and the ends of her hair
begin to burn. Then I ran in, in a small dressing room that was on the
Washington side, there was a big crowd and I went out from there,
stood in the center of the room between the machines and between the
examining tables. I noticed afterwards on the other side, near the
Washington side windows, Bernstein, the manager’s brother throwing
around like a wild cat on the windows, and he was chasing his head
out of the window, and pull himself back – he wanted to jump, I
suppose, but he was afraid. And then I saw the flames cover him. I
noticed on the Greene Street side some one else fall down on the floor
and the flames cover him. And then I stood in the center of the room,
and I just turned my coat on the left side with the fur to my face, the
lining on the outside, got hold of a bunch of dresses that was lying on
the examining table not burned yet, covered up my head and I tried to
run through the flames to the Greene Street side. The whole door was
a red curtain of flame, but a young lady came and she began to pull me
in the back of my dress and she wouldn’t let me in. I kicked her with
my foot and I don’t know what became of her, and I ran out through
the Greene Street side door, right through the flames, on to the roof.
Q.
When you were standing toward the middle of the floor had you
your pocketbook with you?
A.
Yes sir, my pocketbook began to burn already, but I pressed it to
my heart to extinguish the fire.144
This is extraordinarily powerful testimony, even when printed on paper and read
almost one hundred years after the event. Alterman’s vivid description of the
Triangle Shirtwaist fire, told by someone so close to death herself as she literally
Max Steuer’s Cross Examination of Kate Alterman in People v. Harris & Blank (“Cross
Examination”), 2-3 (1987).
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kicked and fought her way to safety, certainly had a dramatic impact on the jury of
twelve men who were trying the case. Max Steur is reported as saying
I cannot describe to you . . . the pathetic picture made by that little
girl. I cannot reproduce the tears that were running down her cheeks,
nor can I tell you how the eyes of the twelve jurors were riveted on her
and how they sat craning forward, thrilled by the girl’s story and how
they wept when she told it.145
Alterman’s testimony had conveyed in the most compelling way possible some
crucial aspects of the prosecution’s case: Schwartz had attempted to escape through
the ninth floor Washington Place door; the door was locked;146 and Schwartz had
died. In short, Kate Alterman’s testimony was devastating to the defense.
And yet there were aspects to Alterman’s testimony that sounded strange, to Steuer
at least. She used turns of phrase – “throwing around like a wild cat,” and “red
curtain of fire” – that sounded at odds with her normal mode of speech, the detail of
pressing her pocketbook to her “heart to extinguish the fire” sounded more
melodramatic than necessary, and the word “extinguish” sounded more like a
lawyer than a teenage immigrant.”147
Steuer began his cross examination by a series of questions that established with
whom Alterman had been in contact since the fire and then – breaking all the
logical rules against having a witness repeat damaging testimony – he said: “Now,
I want you to tell me your story over again, just as you told it before.”148 And
Alterman went back through her description of the fire, using again phrases like
“Bernstein, the manager’s brother,”149 “he wanted to jump, I suppose, but he was
afraid,”150 “I pressed it to my heart to extinguish the fire,”151 and “a red curtain of
fire.152 Steuer pointed out that she had left out the description of Bernstein
jumping around “like a wildcat,” and Alterman reaffirmed that he was “[l]ike a
wildcat.”153
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Then, after a few more questions that helped to locate where Alterman had been
when the fire started, Steuer asked her to tell her story yet again.154 And again, she
used phrases like “Bernstein, the manager’s brother,”155 “he wanted to jump, I
suppose, but he was afraid,”156 “I pressed it to my heart to extinguish the fire,”157 “a
red curtain of fire,”158 and that Bernstein “jumped like a wildcat on the walls.”159
The trial then broke for lunch, and when Steuer’s cross examination resumed, he
got Alterman to deny that she had discussed her testimony with anyone before she
gave it, and then asked her to tell her story for a fourth time. And again, she used
phrases like “Bernstein’s brother,”160 “he wanted to jump out from the window, I
suppose, but he was afraid,”161 and “a red curtain of fire,”162 and indicated again
that Bernstein was “throwing around like a wildcat.”163
On re-cross, Steuer got Alterman to affirm that she had not prepared her testimony
and asked her if she could tell her story in any words or in the words she used when
she gave her written statement.164 Although she testified that she could, she left
the witness stand without offering a differently-phrased account of the fire. During
his closing argument, Steuer “quietly pointed out to the jury that Kate Alterman’s
high flown language could not have been her own. She was not testifying to an
honest recollection, but to a doctored version of the events of March 25, 1911, a
version which had been prepared by another and committed by Kate to memory.”165
The jury acquitted both defendants.
Steuer’s genius is evident in his two key responses to Alterman’s testimony. First,
Steuer recognized that the testimony was probably coached, because of the
predominance of vocabulary and phraseology inconstant with who Alterman was.
And second, Steuer recognized the power and likely factual accuracy of the
testimony166 and that he could not undertake a destructive, bullying, crossId., at 10.
Id., at 10, 11.
156
Id., at 11.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id., at 12. This time through her description of events, Alterman omitted that Bernstein was
the manager’s brother.
161
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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examination of such a sympathetic witness. Instead, he realized – apparently as
the direct examination was proceeding – that his only hope of deflecting the harm
from Alterman’s testimony was to show the jury how coached it was.
Neither of these responses was “logical:” in all material, evidentiary terms, the
testimony was both truthful and devastating, and in presenting it, the prosecution
had every reason to believe that it would bring about a conviction of both
defendants. Instead, Steuer’s responses to Alterman’s testimony were
quintessentially empathetic, in that they set logic aside and dealt, instead, with a
deep personal understanding of what Alterman’s words meant and how to counter
their effect on the jury.
It is this empathetic response, and its importance for lawyers at both the strategic
and tactical level, that we will next consider.
E.

The Need For Empathetic Lawyering

The examples outlined above show the failures that can occur when empathy is
lacking, and suggest that a more empathetic response to both witness and jury can
produce more effective lawyering strategy and tactics, and ultimately a more
satisfactory result for the client. In the narrow context of the dictionary’s definition
of the term, then, empathy forms, or should form, a crucial part of a lawyer’s
arsenal although, as Nussbaum cautions, empathy alone can be dangerous, and
should be used “only in combination with a directive ethical intelligence that
animates the whole of the text, and allows us to see the world in a way that permits
human understanding, and the understanding of the people as human.”167
Nussbaum’s caveat is significant because legal education – at least the education
provided to most students in the first year of law school – can be viewed as a
systematic attempt to eliminate that directive ethical and empathetic intelligence
and replace it with an ethical, but entirely logical, intelligence that prohibits human
understanding. It is this elimination of ethical intelligence that so concerned the
authors of the Carnegie Report when they wrote that law schools seek to “flip off the
switch of ethical and human concern, teach legal analysis, and later, when students
have mastered the central intellectual skill of thinking like a lawyer, flip the switch
back on.”168
Anecdotal evidence, at least, suggests that the students understand that the legal
education process changes them. Responding to a survey conducted by Lani
Guinier at the University of Pennsylvania, one student noted that “I changed so
much. I used to be a much more compassionate person, much more tolerant of
167
168
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different choices, in terms of lifestyle, in terms of personality. I just feel like law
school has put huge blinders on my eyes.”169 And another student participating in
the Guinier study responded that
I feel that [compassion] is something that is eradicated in law school.
This notion that we can present things as though, like the law, it’s a
self-contained unit, it’s a sphere that we can look down upon as though
we were astronauts that can look down upon the earth. The whole
idea that these things are neutral and that a neutral outcome results
just eliminates any notion of compassion because professors sort of
play on that. ‘Oh you feel sorry for those people. Oh well that’s too
bad. Oh, well the law says X.’ We really are taught that compassion is
a bad thing.170
Guinier argues that because law schools are institutions whose role is, in large part,
to produce students who are ready to participate in a competitive legal employment
market,171 they are places that “valorize[] sorting, [and that] reward[] people who
think fast but not always those who think deeply.”172 She continues that
the way things are done in law school (the Socratic method, timed
issue-spotting exams, large classrooms, unpatrolled and informal
networks) devalues and distorts those characteristics associated with
women, such as empathy, relational logic, and nonaggressive behavior.
In this understanding, law school unintentionally uses a male-oriented
baseline to measure male/female differences, rendering women as less
than competent.173

Anonymous third year woman law student at the University of Pennsylvania Law School,
quoted in LANI GUINIER, ET AL, BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE (“Guinier”), 35 (1997).
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Id., at 52 (quoting an anonymous third year woman law student at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School).
171
Guinier is not alone in this belief. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer,
Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1231, 1246 (1990-91)(“[F]irms prize law students not for what they have learned about law but
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In order to succeed, Guinier concludes, at least some women become bi-cultural by
“learn[ing] to function as ‘social males’ and on some level they . . . become
‘gentlemen.’”174
Whether or not one accepts Guinier’s feminist critique of the law school process, or
her perception that empathy is a characteristic uniquely associated with women,
there can be little argument that law school is a particularly transformative
experience for those who come with well-developed senses of empathy. Aside from
the personal harm such a transformation can cause,175 it can also cause professional
harm, particularly where, as in the Simpson and Vioxx cases, lawyers make poor
decisions as a result of their failure to calibrate their trial strategies to the actual,
as opposed to logical, responses of the non-lawyer juries who evaluate and decide on
those strategies during their deliberations.
The lawyers in these cases had alternatives. In his review of Merck’s litigation
strategy in the Ernst case, for example, Professor Johansen describes a potential
alternative trial narrative proposed by another member of the Vioxx defense team:
This verdict is bad news for all of us, and some of us will die
prematurely because the lawsuit deterred the research and
development of life-saving drugs.
And Vioxx was one such life-saving drug. The painkillers that it
replaced (and is now replaced by) cause their own health problems,
and current medical thinking is that, at least for some people, Vioxx
would be a safer as well as a more effective pain-killer than aspirin,
despite what we now know to be the latter’s better cardioprotective
profile. But Merck can’t collect $26 million from each person whose life
they save, even it were possible to point to a particular Alvy Singer of

Id., at 68.
There is little question that the law school experience causes many students to suffer
psychological harm. See, e.g., Daicoff, Lawyer, Be Thyself, supra n. 27, at 96; Nancy Soonpa, Stress
in Law Students: A Comparative Study of First-Year, Second-Year, and Third-Year Students, 36 U.
Conn. L. Rev. 355 (2003-04); Ruth Ann McKinney, Depression and Anxiety in Law Students: Are
We Part of the Problem and Can We Be Part of the Solution? 8 J. Legal Writing Inst.. 229 (2002);
Suzanne C. Segerstrom, Perceptions of Stress and Control in the First Semester of Law School, 32
Willamette L. Rev. 593 (1996); B.A. Glesner, Fear and Loathing in the Law Schools, 23 Conn. L.
Rev. 627, 650-53 (1991); Andrew H. Benjamin et al, The Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse,
and Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawyers, 13 Int’l J. L. & Psychiatry 233 (1990); Andrew H.
Benjamin et al, The Role of Legal Education in Producing Psychological Distresses Among Law
Students and Lawyers, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 225 (1986). No one will argue that the
suppression of empathetic responses is the sole, or even the principal, cause of this harm.
Nonetheless, it cannot be discounted as a contributing factor.
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Hypothetical City, Iowa, who didn’t die of aspirin-related complications
because he was taking Vioxx.176
Professor Johansen notes that if Merck had told this story “— that Merck was the
hero in this story [and] that the world is a more dangerous place without Vioxx and
other drugs that may never make it to market – it might have resonated more
effectively with the jury [than the more fact-based approach Merck adopted].”177
In the Simpson case, the prosecution’s inability to consider the possibility that a
jury might be unwilling to convict Simpson based on an extended domestic violence
theory, and might be willing to set aside the logical inconsistencies of the police
conspiracy theory offered by the defense, led to a failed prosecution. By contrast, a
more empathetic evaluation of the likely jury reaction to the prosecution’s domestic
violence case theory might have led to a shorter, more focused, trial in which the
evidence against Simpson could have been presented more directly and
compellingly.
Nussbaum sums up the value of empathy to lawyers, and the danger of suppressing
the empathetic instinct, as follows:
[T]he imagination of human predicaments is like a muscle: It
atrophies unless it is continually used. And the imagination of human
distress, fear, anger, and overwhelming grief is an important attribute
in the law. Lawyers need it to understand and depict effectively the
plight of their clients. Lawyers advising corporations need it in order
to develop a complete picture of the likely consequences of various
policy choices for the lives of consumers, workers, and the public at
large, including the public in distant countries where corporations do
business. Factual knowledge is crucial, and in its absence the
imagination can often steer us wrong. But knowledge is inert without
the ability to make situations real inside oneself, to understand their
human meaning.178
It is empathy’s ability to act as a moral compass which allows lawyers to steer an
often difficult professional and personal course in a complicated world.
Yet while the value of empathy as a professional tool for lawyers is readily
apparent, the legal education world still behaves as if its primary, if not only, task
is to eliminate empathy and to train its students to “think like lawyers.” Perhaps
Johansen, supra n. 58, at 80, quoting, Ted Frank, Ernst v. Merck – One More View, (Sept. 1,
2005), available at http://www.aei.org/article/23166.
177
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the time has come to change that approach and to consider a multi-pronged
approach to helping law students develop their empathetic skills. This is not to
suggest that law students should not also be taught to think logically and clinically
about the legal problems they are asked to confront, but it is to suggest that this
education can be accomplished in addition to, and not at the expense of, an ability to
think empathetically about the responses of clients and, in the case of litigation,
juries to the facts and law of a case.
F.

Developing a Sense of Empathy in Lawyers

Explaining the professional benefits of empathetic lawyering is easier than
describing what can be done about developing, or enhancing, a sense of empathy in
current and future lawyers. In fact, it is likely that there is no single solution to the
conundrum of how to make lawyers more empathetic, and the best solution is to
seek to permeate empathetic development before, during, and after law school. And
while much of what follows is raised in the context of the law school curriculum,
because it is in law school that much of this non-empathetic response is learned, the
principles underpinning the courses described here could, and perhaps should, be
readily adopted by law firms or even by individual lawyers for their own use.
1.

Empathetic Education Before Law School

One of the strengths of the current legal education model is that a student can come
to law school with no prior training or educational prerequisites. Unlike medical
school, with its extensive list of preliminary coursework,179 or other graduate
programs, which typically require a strong preliminary grounding in their subject
matter, law school imposes no formal prerequisites on its students and accepts them
from any academic background as long as their GPA and LSAT scores indicate an
ability to cope with the rigors of a law school education.
Whether or not it desirable that law schools maintain this tradition of accepting
students without formal prerequisites is a question for another time. Law schools
could, though, initiate at least an informal, and voluntary, plan of study for those
who have already applied and been accepted into law school in order to help with
the transition to the study of law. In particular, while most law schools send their
prospective students suggested reading lists for the summer before the students
Harvard Medical School, for example, tells its prospective students that “[a] study . . . has
shown that students are successful in their medical studies regardless of their undergraduate
concentration, providing that they have had adequate science preparation.”
http://hms.harvard.edu/admissions/default.asp?page=requirements. “Adequate” preparation
includes: one year of biology, with laboratory experience, two years of chemistry, with laboratory
experience, one year of physics, one year of calculus, and one year of expository writing. Id.
Students must also be “comfortable” with upper-level mathematics (through differential equations
and linear algebra), biochemistry, and molecular biology. Id.
179
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come to law school, a more formalized and intensive course of study could help
incoming students to practice their study skills and – more importantly, for our
purposes – help to develop the students’ empathetic responses.
There are many possible models for a pre-law school summer course. One possible
approach is outlined by Charles Cox and Maury Landsman.180 While Cox and
Landsman describe their course as one taught during law school, it would be
relatively easy to modify it to fit the looser requirements of a summer pre-law school
course, with distance learning technology taking the place of in-class discussions.
In the class they describe, students are given a one-page summary of the facts of a
case, but are not given any law from the case, and are asked to discuss “[w]hat
should the law be [and] [w]hy?”181 The authors note that they aim to “help the
students learn that they can resolve what the law should be, and usually is, just by
‘thinking it through.’ The technique is simple: focus on the facts of the case and
remember that the law is only answers to human problems. . . .”182 Cox and
Landsman require the students to read two chapter of John Noonan’s Persons and
Masks of the Law183 and note that through the reading of “the extensive unreported
facts of the widely known Palsgraf case,” the students “get a look at the many
factors outside the law that may, and arguable do or should, affect a decision. . . .”184
Cox and Landsman’s course, which they have apparently taught to general acclaim
at the University of Minnesota Law School for several years,185 points out a way in
which students can be introduced to key aspects of the legal process without losing
sight of the importance of the facts – both disclosed and undisclosed and related and
unrelated to the specific circumstances of the case186 – to the actual, as opposed to
aspirational, outcome of the case. This approach is fundamentally empathetic, and
yet does not impede the development of the students’ ability to think like lawyers.
If anything, it enhances that ability by allowing the students to explore a deeper,
more nuanced approach to decision-making than that typically offered in the
traditional first-year torts class. If the students had taken this class before entering

Charles A. Cox, Sr. & Maury S. Landsman, Learning the Law by Avoiding It in the Process:
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into the formal study of torts, their Socratic discussions with their professors would
likely have been more complex and more interesting for both students and teacher.
Another course studying the way we make decisions, and one that could also be
adapted to fit into a summer pre-law school schedule, is described by Martha
Nussbaum.187 The course, called, descriptively enough, “Decisionmaking,” is taught
jointly by Nussbaum and Professor Douglas Baird, “an expert in the application of
game theory to the law.188
Addressing both the analytical and the normative ethical aspects of
good decision-making in public life, we acquaint the students with
expected utility theory, game theory, and the new behavioral law and
economics. We have many students who basically think ethics is a
“soft” subject. But we then get them reading Kant, Mill, and Aristotle,
and odder authors still, such as Henry James, and Mahasweta Devi. I
am optimistic about the ability of courses such as this to expose a wide
range of law students to good normative reasoning.189
A course like this, in which students read and discuss – both with each other and
with a teacher – a carefully selected group of texts that allow them to explore the
nature of decision-making, would serve the traditional law school goal of helping the
students develop their critical, logical skills, but could also help the students
understand that logical decisions are made in an ethical, and empathetic, context.
A third approach to a summer course might take one or more pieces of extended
litigations – the Simpson, Ernst, and Triangle Waist Company cases discussed here
are three possible examples, but there are many more – and have the students
study and discuss both the facts and the various strategies adopted by the attorneys
and why they were, or were not, successful. This type of course would allow the
students to begin the careful reading they will need to employ in their law school
classes, but would also encourage their empathetic responses to the material and
might challenge their expectations that logical trial strategies and tactics are
always the best ones.
This type of course runs close to a law and literature approach – in this case, with
the law as literature – and that model is another that might successfully be used in
a pre-law school summer course. This type of course – described in Professor
Reichman’s evaluation of the influence of Martha Nussbaum’s Poetic Justice190 –
Nussbaum, supra, n. 19, at 274-75.
Id., at 274.
189
Id., at 274-75.
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would deal with decision making or, perhaps more accurately, the deferral of
decision making, and would involve the study of literature and the lessons it can
teach lawyers.191 This type of course is well-suited to students who are still novices
in the current legal education model, and as Reichman observes, “[p]erhaps it is
time to recognize the need for teaching literature and the literary approach to law
as part of the introductory classes in law, in a separate and mandatory course
where literary methods will be taught systematically and with a critical
approach.”192
A course of this type would involve the reading of literature specifically as a means
of stimulating the students’ empathetic responses.
The main thesis [of Nussbaum’s Poetic Justice] is that the reading of
literature – an ethical reading – arouses empathy, and that this
empathy allows for better judgment. . . . Developing the capacity to
exercise empathetic judgment in literature will also serve legal
judgment,. It will allow for judgment is neutral but not aloof, sensitive
but uncompromising on moral principles, personal but not capricious
(or idiosyncratic), but not overbearing of diffident. Focusing on works
by Dickens, Whitman, and Wright, Nussbaum provides guidelines for
properly reading literature as an exercise of developing empathetic
judgment. . . . 193
Such a course would be particularly valuable to students before they develop fullyformed legal-logical reflexes, because it would encourage them to withhold
judgment rather than to exercise the immediate judgment often called for in law
school classes. As Reichman notes,
[o]ne of the basic components of human culture is the constantly
exercised capacity for making judgments. We are quick to judge: we
easily determine the reality presented before us, often without pausing
I would have explicitly acknowledged this as a “law and literature” class but for Professor
Nussbaum’s reservations about that label. “I used to teach [a Law and Literature] course, and I now
no longer do. The name ‘Law and Literature’ denotes no clearly demarcated subject matter. My
course did have a definite subject matter: It was the role played by compassion and empathy in the
law, and I pursued that theme through literary . . . and legal texts of many kinds. But, not
surprisingly (despite the fact that I thought I had described the course clearly enough) students
came to the course not expecting a sustained philosophical examination of the emotions, and
expecting instead a lighter, more entertaining kind of course about literary representations of legal
situations. Perhaps that sort of problem can be solved, but I think one cannot rely for the training I
would like to promote, on elective courses of this nature, however well designed.” Nussabum, supra
n. 19, at 278.
192
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to reflect whether what appears (or is presented) as real is indeed real.
We swiftly identify the good and the bad, often resorting to simplistic
labels and categories, and frequently do so based on a number of
assumptions and shortcuts – rules of thumb – the validity of which we
generally do not bother to check.”194
But while it is easy for students to reach judgments about what is and is not a
logically correct decision, such immediate responses tend to ignore the more
empathetic question of what the “correct” decision, viewed in a broader context,
might be. By contrast, literature forces us to slow down our decision-making facility
and to assimilate more information before we reach our conclusions about
appropriate outcomes.
Good literature, unlike superficial or programmatic literature, exposes
the reader to the complexity of the human condition even by telling a
simple story. The novel, especially because it is a figment of the
imagination, calls first for withholding factual judgment. The readers
are aware that the story they have before them is not a true story, but
they are prepared to treat it as plausible – as long as it intertwines the
kind of events that seem conceivable, based on the cultural horizon and
human nature with which they are familiar. The suspension of
disbelief is not expressed merely in accepting the fictional story as
possible, but also by the various sources from which we are willing to
receive information within the story.195
Moreover, literature allows us – uniquely – the chance to insert ourselves into
another (albeit fictional) person’s mind and hear their thoughts:
[T]he vast majority of novels directly present to readers their main
characters’ thoughts, and we have learned to accept that as perfectly
natural. One of the pleasures of reading novels is the enjoyment of
being told what a variety of fictional people are thinking. It is a relief
from the business of real life, much of which requires the ability to
decode accurately the behavior of others.196
One of the benefits of literature to law students is the opportunities it offers to
practice this empathetic decoding of real-life behavior by providing fictional
examples for study, reflection, and discussion.
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It might be imagined that law students have already experienced the benefits of
literature well before they come to law school. But this is not a safe assumption. A
recent study suggests that “[l]ess than half of the adult American population now
reads literature”197 and that literary reading had declined by 10% between 1982 and
2002.198 A snapshot picture of some of the incoming law school class of 2006199
suggests that the situation with law students is a little better than the national
average, with 5% responding that they had read for pleasure more than one book a
week, 20.4% responding that they read one book a week, 31.8% responding that
they had read one book a month, 26.2% responding that they had read more than
one book a year, although fewer than one book a month, 3.5% responding that they
had read one book a year, and 1.6% responding that they had read fewer than one
book a year.200
Although these data suggest that law students’ literary reading is higher than the
national average, though, they are still not cause for celebration. Based on this
survey’s results, fully 60% of responding incoming law students indicated that they
read for pleasure one book or fewer each month. For those who celebrate the ability
of literature to deliver important information about empathy and decision-making,
such a reading rate would appear to be depressingly low.
These results mirror a decline in empathy found in American college students. In a
meta-analysis of American college students announced at the annual meeting of the
Association for Psychological Science, researchers concluded that college students
today score “40% lower than their counterparts of 20 or 30 years ago, as measured
by standard tests of this personality trait.”201 The authors of the study suggest
several possible reasons for this decline, including exposure to violent media and
the advent of social media.202
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ADULT
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Whatever the reasons for this apparently dramatic drop in empathetic response, we
are confronted by the reality that law students are likely significantly less
empathetic coming in to law school than were their predecessors, and that they also
appear to be reading less. Developing pre-law school law and literature courses in
which students could participate before coming to law school would go some way to
remedying the literature gap, and might help improve student empathetic
responses as well.
Allowing law students to confront the complexity inherent in the decision-making
process, and equipping them with the tools to make more nuanced, informed
decisions about the cases they begin to read on the first day of law school, would
encourage them to remember that logic need not be divorced from empathy, and
that the two types of decision making can coexist. In essence, this approach to legal
education gives the students access to the “switch of ethical and human concern”
the Carnegie Report’s authors write of,203 and would allow them to control when the
switch is flipped on or off.
2.

Empathetic Education in Law School

Useful though such pre-law school courses might be, they would have more impact
if they were followed up by some law school curricular reforms that allowed the
messages the pre-law students had learned to be enhanced and developed by
courses in law school as well. These changes might include not just a greater
appreciation for the importance of empathy in the traditional doctrinal courses
where, researchers have noted, it is generally ignored, but also additional
programming devoted to the restoration of the balance between empathy and logic.
The pre-law school summer courses discussed above could be adapted for inclusion
in the regular law school curriculum. Indeed, both the Cox and Landsman204 and
Nussbaum205 courses were designed as elective courses in law school curricula and
would require adaptation to be taught as pre-law school courses. The location of
these, and other non-doctrinal, courses in the traditional upper-class law school
curriculum is less than desirable, though, while better than nothing, would be more
effective and beneficial to students if they could be part of the first year curriculum.
There already is at least one course that helps students develop their empathetic
senses in the typical law school first year curriculum, although it is usually thought
to have a different function. The legal research and writing course required by most
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law schools206 typically involve a combination of classroom instruction and written
assignments using simulations to recreate client problems that must be analyzed by
the students. Although these assignments are developed to reinforce lessons of
structure and analysis that are taught in the legal writing classroom, they can be
designed to stimulate a student’s empathetic response by contextualizing legal
analysis more realistically than can be achieved in the typical doctrinal class
laboratory setting.
Writing, after all, is – or should be – an exercise in applied empathy. In order to
persuade a reader of something, whether it be the accuracy of a set of facts, a legal
interpretation, or the believability of a fictional account, a writer must attempt to
place him or herself in the mind of the reader and try to imagine the reader’s
response to the written material.207 It is precisely this skill which lawyers must
develop in order to communicate effectively, and this collateral benefit to legal
writing courses in law school should be recognized and emphasized in law school
curricula by expanding the number of legal writing courses offered to students.
Valuable though this pre-clinical engagement with a more empathetic approach to
legal analysis is, though, it alone is likely not enough to counter the force of the
more purely logical approach employed in most doctrinal courses. And while those
courses can, and should, be taught in a way that incorporates both the doctrinal
lessons to be distilled from case law and the more human lessons to be drawn from
the facts surrounding those cases,208 an additional, required, course in the first year

The American Bar Association (“ABA”) Standards for legal education require that law
schools provide substantial instruction in “writing in a legal context, including at least one rigorous
writing experience in the first year and at least one additional rigorous writing experience after the
first year.” ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools, Standard 302(2)(3), available at Council
Standards, Chapter 3, available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/20082009.
StandardsWebContent/Chapter%203.pdf. This standard is satisfied, in most law schools, by a course
in legal research and writing. See, Association of Legal Writing Directors & Legal Writing Institute.
Report of the Annual Legal Writing Survey, 2010, at 7 (2010), available at
http://www.alwd.org/surveys/survey_results/2010_Survey_Results.pdf (indicating that 181 law
schools teach legal writing in the fall semester and 184 schools teach legal writing in the spring
207
See, e.g., Trimble, supra, n. 71, at 5-6 (“The writer . . . after realizing that a world – the
reader – exists out there beyond himself, slowly comes to develop, first, an awareness of himself from
the reader’s vantage point (objectivity); next, a capacity to put himself imaginatively in the mind of
the reader (empathy); and finally, an appreciation of the reader’s rights and feelings (courtesy).”)
208
The recent publication of a series of books that go into more depth about the facts of cases
than do the often terse factual summary offered by the courts is an encouraging sign. These books,
published by Foundation Press, include the Trial Stories volume discussed at n. 76, supra, and also
have volumes covering, for example, Administrative Law, Antitrust, Business Tax, Civil Procedure,
Constitutional Law, Evidence, Labor Law, and Torts. These books, used in conjunction with more
typical casebooks, offer at least one model by which the human implications implicit in all court
decisions could be discussed in doctrinal classes.
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of law school that focuses on the empathetic, and, perhaps, ethical209 aspects of law
practice would be of tremendous benefit to the students.
Locating such a course in the first year, and ideally in the first semester, would
allow it to serve as a valuable counterweight to the more dispassionate lessons
typically taught in doctrinal courses. Although students often have access to
courses that engage some or all of this material in the upper-class curriculum,210 the
damage is, by then, likely done and the students will likely have difficulty
reintegrating a more empathetic approach to analysis into their newly-created
lawyer personas.
I use “damage” intentionally here. Some have speculated that the analytical
approach employed by law schools in the first year contributes to the welldocumented psychological harm211 suffered by many first year law students.212 And
while it would be fanciful to assert that a course requiring a more balanced
approach to analysis would cancel-out the potentially negative effects of the more
traditional law school pedagogical style, it would at least alert the students that
empathy is not forbidden to lawyers and that an empathetic approach to legal and
factual analysis can be an important aspect of a lawyer’s work.
209
By using “ethical” to describe this possible course, I intend to make a conscious distinction
between such a course and the more circumscribed “professional responsibility” courses that form a
typical part of the second year law student’s experience.
210
Even if a law school has a “law and literature” elective course in its curriculum, such a
course is often not available to all students in that school. See, e.g., Reichman, supra n. 2, at 301.
Reichmann notes that Harvard University, New York University, and the University of
Pennsylvania “only provide one elective law and literature class to the juris doctorate candidates,
each being limited to fifteen and eighteen students.” Id., n. 16. In addition, in the academic year
2004-05, several schools did not offer a law and literature class at all, including “Stanford
University, Yale University, the University of Chicago, Cornell University, the University of
California at Berkeley, and Vanderbilt University.” Id. Of course, Nussbaum’s retreat from the “law
and literature” term (see n. 191) might why there was no such named class at the University of
Chicago.
211
For a discussion of some of the psychological harm suffered by first year law students, and
the possible causes for such harm, see, e.g.: Nancy Soonpa, Stress in Law Students: A Comparative
Study of First-Year, Second-Year, and Third-Year Students, 36 U. Conn. L. Rev. 355 (2003-04);
Ruth Ann McKinney, Depression and Anxiety in Law Students: Are We Part of the Problem and Can
We Be Part of the Solution? 8 J. Legal Writing Inst.. 229 (2002); Krieger, supra n. 36, Suzanne C.
Segerstrom, Perceptions of Stress and Control in the First Semester of Law School, 32 Willamette L.
Rev. 593 (1996); Peter Kutulakis, Stress and Competence: From Law Student to Professional, 21
Cap. U. L. Rev. 835 (1992); B.A. Glesner, Fear and Loathing in the Law Schools, 23 Conn. L. Rev.
627 (1991); Andrew H. Benjamin et al, The Role of Legal Education in Producing Psychological
Distresses Among Law Students and Lawyers, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 225 (1986); Lawrence
Silver, Anxiety and the First Semester of Law School, 4 Wis. L. Rev. 1201 (1968).
212
See, e.g., Gerald F. Hess, Heads and Hearts: The Teaching and Learning Environment in
Law School, 52 J. Legal Educ. 75, 75-6 (2002)(“Causes of student distress include the overwhelming
workload, intimidating classroom dynamics, excessive competition, astronomical debt, personal
isolation, lack of feedback, and the nearly exclusive emphasis on linear, logical, doctrinal analysis.”)
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3.

Empathetic Education After Law School

Some might question the notion that law schools have a role to play in legal
education after their students graduate. There is enough to do, they might argue,
in the three years the students are in school. Once law students walk across the
stage with their degrees in hand and are transformed before the faculty’s eyes into
alumni, the law school’s responsibility for their active education has ceased.
Certainly it is true that a law school’s formal educational role, as with any academic
institution, ends with the graduation of its students. But law schools could, and
perhaps should, continue to offer opportunities for their former students to continue
their legal education after graduation. Many schools already offer continuing legal
educational opportunities as part of their alumni reunions or other law school
events, and adding training in empathy as one of the programs offered, or as part of
other programs, should pose little challenge. Law schools might also consider
introducing on-line programs, based on courses, such as law and literature courses
already taught at the school, that would help alumni, wherever they might be
physically located, to improve or perhaps develop their empathetic skills. Such
courses are not difficult to set-up, would not fall foul of the American Bar
Association’s limitations on on-line courses offered as part of a J.D. program,213 and
would offer alumni not only a chance to stay in touch with their law schools but also
a chance to engage in a discussion – with faculty and with each other – about how to
communicate better with non-lawyers. Programs like this could serve both an
educational and a broader, humanizing, role and would benefit the alumni who
participated in them and the law schools that offered them.214
CONCLUSION
The ubiquity of the Langdellian approach in contemporary legal education has
made it difficult, if not impossible, for law schools to contemplate alternatives to it.
Robert Berring has traced this effect – what might be called the ontological power of
classification – from Blackstone, through Langdell, and down to today.215 Berring
notes that in Blackstone’s time, the common law “was a hodge-podge of local
ABA Standard 306 (c) provides that students in accredited law school programs may not take
more than four credit hours in any one semester, or more than twelve credit hours total.
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/2009-2010%20StandardsWebContent/Chapter3.pdf, at 2829.
214
The obvious benefits to law schools would include continued contact with a group of alumni
interested in participating in, and benefiting from, law school activities, as well as the general sense
of good-will generated by a school that is sufficiently interested in its alumni to create special
programming for them.
215
Robert Berring, Legal Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts, 2 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 305 (2000).
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practice and custom.216 Blackstone’s achievement, according to Berring, was to take
“a messy smorgasbord of common law doctrines and practice and organize it into a
comprehensible series of propositions. He supplied a structure of categories and
concepts that fit the existing data.”217
It was this framework of common law doctrines, an artificial construct for
Blackstone’s pedagogical purposes, that Langdell seized on and expanded in his
development of Harvard’s law school curriculum. “A close examination of Langdell’s
work in shaping the law school curriculum – a curriculum that persists today –
shows that it is a descendant of Blackstone’s universe. Langdell’s belief that law
was at heart scientific, and subject to discovery through the reading of common law
cases, flowed smoothly from Blackstone.”218
And, indeed, it is a testament to both Blackstone and Langdell’s conception, and the
power of the classification structure they helped to create, that it survives virtually
intact over one hundred years after its introduction at Harvard. But therein lies
the problem, because one of the side-effects of powerful classification systems is
their ability to blind us to other possibilities. “Good, useable systems disappear
almost by definition. The easier they are to use, the harder they are to see.”219
Eventually classification decisions that were once based on the banal
realties of constructing a workable sorting process transform that very
process. Now this early decision becomes the only possible outcome;
the result appears to be natural. Indeed, those using the system see no
decision at all. Because those who use the system tend to
conceptualize in terms of the system and, as a system matures, it
becomes authoritative, the classification system simply describes the
universe.220
The gradual reification of Langdell’s approach to American legal education presents
significant challenges for those seeking to propose changes. Put simply, it is
difficult to imagine an alternative approach, let alone persuade that such an
alternative is feasible. As Berring observes, we live in a legal world which is, in
effect “a conceptual universe of thinkable thoughts that has enormous power.
Indicative of its real strength is the fact that those using it do not appear to perceive
Id., at 308.
Id. As Berring observes, some have argued that Blackstone took much of his methodology
from others. Id., n. 7. Berring concludes, though, that this is “not worth bothering about. It was
Blackstone’s version that changed the way the law was conceptualized and that is what matters.”
Id.
218
Id., at 309.
219
Id., at 310, quoting GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STARR, SORTING THINGS OUT:
CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 33 (1999).
220
Berring, supra n. 215, at 310.
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it; the classification of legal concepts appears inevitable.”221 To consider changes in
this universe is, almost literally, unthinkable.
Yet that should nonetheless be the task of legal educators and the broader
community of lawyers. As Martha Nussbaum reminds us, one of the necessary
qualities for a citizen in a pluralistic democracy is that we lead “the ‘examined
life,’”222 and while Nussbaum was writing about law students, her observation
surely applies to law school faculties and lawyers as well. Difficult though it is for
faculty members, who have gained so much by working within the Langdellian
construct of what a law school curriculum should be, and for lawyers, who were
trained, and succeeded, in that Langdellian model, they should examine the value,
or lack of value, in its continued vitality in a contemporary world and should be
willing to modify or abandon it if they can come up with a better approach.
No one will argue with Nussbaum that “[l]egal education is specialized professional
training, not a general preparation for citizenship and life,”223 nor with Professor
Johnson when he notes that “a law degree is not supposed to be a substitute for a
good advanced liberal arts degree.224 The problem is that even assuming law
students all came to law school with well-developed liberal arts backgrounds that
would allow them to consider the issues and concerns of the law on an empathetic
basis,225 law schools intentionally and systematically prevents students from
responding emotionally during their first year of law school, making empathy
difficult or even distasteful for them. The upper-level curricula at most law schools
might take some steps to transfuse some sense of empathy back into the students
during their second and third year of law school, but the harm, by and large, has
already been done.
This approach generally succeeds in teaching students to “think like lawyers,” and
it provides them with a grounding in doctrinal knowledge that will allow them to
function as lawyers upon graduation. But this approach also costs students, both
personally and professionally, by making it difficult, if not impossible, for them to
Id., at 311.
Nussbaum, supra n. 9, at, 320.
223
Id., at 323.
224
Johnson, supra n. 171, at 1251. Professor Johnson goes on to note that “[a]s a colleague
pointed out to me, if a law degree were merely a broad liberal arts degree, we would have difficulty
defending the fact that we pay law professors approximately double what we pay liberal arts
professors. Law school is not liberal-arts graduate school; we pay law professors high salaries
because teaching law is different from teaching other disciplines.” Id. at 1251-52.
225
This is by no means a reasonable assumption. It ignores, for example, the plethora of law
students with backgrounds other than in the liberal arts, and the emphasis on “well-developed”
ignores the variable quality of liberal arts education in this country. See, e.g., Richard P. Vance &
Robert W. Pritchard, Measuring Cultural Knowledge of Law Students, 42 J. Legal Educ. 233, 235
(1992)(students performed “poorly” in a test of their cultural knowledge.)
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think like anyone else. The process makes it difficult, at least for junior lawyers, to
communicate with, or think like, the non-lawyers who are their clients, their
witnesses, and their juries. Ironically, the process of training law students to “think
like lawyers” might make it more difficult for them to do a lawyer’s work.
Left to their own devices, it is unlikely that law school faculties will embrace change
enthusiastically. And while the Carnegie Report presages a more determined
assault on law school pedagogy than has been seen in a while, it seems likely that
any changes that result will be grudging and incremental, rather than wholehearted and extensive. But another, significant, pressure group exists, and its
mobilization could persuade law schools to make faster, comprehensive, and willing
changes to the way they teach.
Alumni are a crucial constituency who have tremendous influence, both as donors to
their law schools and as employers of their more recent graduates, in the way legal
education is delivered. If alumni were to recognize the professional value that
would accrue if newly-minted lawyers came out of law schools with a more nuanced,
empathetic, sense of decision-making and analysis, and were to ask legal educators
and law school administrators to take more note of empathy in law school classes, it
is difficult to imagine law schools not taking close notice of their opinions.
Changing a pedagogical approach so generally accepted as law school’s “signature”
pedagogical approach226 will not be easy, but change is possible, and, once law
schools concede the need for it, could come relatively quickly: models exist, in the
form of the law and literature and legal skills curricula, that can help point the way
towards the necessary changes. Such changes could go some way to plugging the
evident gaps in cultural literacy displayed by law students227 and could help provide
them with the tools necessary to make better decisions on behalf of their clients.
We all – lawyers and non-lawyers alike – would benefit from a recognition that
empathy is just as important to a lawyer’s work as is logical analysis.

Carnegie Report supra n. 17, at 24.
As Professors Vance and Pritchard note, “[l]aw schools alone cannot make up the deficits in
cultural literacy that we are finding [in law students]. Courses in legal ethics and legal history can
help. Continual exposure to interdisciplinary perspectives appears to be more crucial than ever,
given the apparent lack of such exposure in students’ earlier experiences. But professional education
cannot replace adequate preparation in high schools and colleges.” Vance & Pritchard, supra, n.
225, at 239. But their solution – that law schools “ought to demand that the educational process
yield a more culturally literate product.” (id.) – is too facile and lets us off the hook too easily.
Certainly the apparent rapid decline in cultural education is deeply disturbing, and certainly
American high schools and colleges should be mobilizing to address it. But even if such changes are
addressed in the school system, law schools cannot wait the ten to fifteen years it will take for any
changes made today i to show up in their incoming class. They, too, have an obligation to address
the problem.
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